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PK[MMDETAILSnuW+A -*- text -*- Format of colon listings ======================== First an example: $ gpg --fixed-list-mode --with-colons --list-keys \ --with-fingerprint --with-fingerprint wk@gnupg.org pub:f:1024:17:6C7EE1B8621CC013:899817715:1055898235::m:::scESC: fpr:::::::::ECAF7590EB3443B5C7CF3ACB6C7EE1B8621CC013: uid:f::::::::Werner Koch : uid:f::::::::Werner Koch : sub:f:1536:16:06AD222CADF6A6E1:919537416:1036177416:::::e: fpr:::::::::CF8BCC4B18DE08FCD8A1615906AD222CADF6A6E1: sub:r:1536:20:5CE086B5B5A18FF4:899817788:1025961788:::::esc: fpr:::::::::AB059359A3B81F410FCFF97F5CE086B5B5A18FF4: The double --with-fingerprint prints the fingerprint for the subkeys too. --fixed-list-mode is the modern listing way printing dates in seconds since Epoch and does not merge the first userID with the pub record; gpg2 does this by default and the option is a dummy. 1. Field: Type of record pub = public key crt = X.509 certificate crs = X.509 certificate and private key available sub = subkey (secondary key) sec = secret key ssb = secret subkey (secondary key) uid = user id (only field 10 is used). uat = user attribute (same as user id except for field 10). sig = signature rev = revocation signature fpr = fingerprint: (fingerprint is in field 10) pkd = public key data (special field format, see below) grp = reserved for gpgsm rvk = revocation key tru = trust database information spk = signature subpacket 2. Field: A letter describing the calculated validity. This is a single letter, but be prepared that additional information may follow in some future versions. (not used for secret keys) o = Unknown (this key is new to the system) i = The key is invalid (e.g. due to a missing self-signature) d = The key has been disabled (deprecated - use the 'D' in field 12 instead) r = The key has been revoked e = The key has expired - = Unknown validity (i.e. no value assigned) q = Undefined validity '-' and 'q' may safely be treated as the same value for most purposes n = The key is valid m = The key is marginal valid. f = The key is fully valid u = The key is ultimately valid. This often means that the secret key is available, but any key may be marked as ultimately valid. If the validity information is given for a UID or UAT record, it describes the validity calculated based on this user ID. If given for a key record it describes the best validity taken from the best rated user ID. For X.509 certificates a 'u' is used for a trusted root certificate (i.e. for the trust anchor) and an 'f' for all other valid certificates. 3. Field: length of key in bits. 4. Field: Algorithm: 1 = RSA 16 = Elgamal (encrypt only) 17 = DSA (sometimes called DH, sign only) 20 = Elgamal (sign and encrypt - don't use them!) (for other id's see include/cipher.h) 5. Field: KeyID 6. Field: Creation Date (in UTC). For UID and UAT records, this is the self-signature date. Note that the date is usally printed in seconds since epoch, however, we are migrating to an ISO 8601 format (e.g. "19660205T091500"). This is currently only relevant for X.509. A simple way to detect the new format is to scan for the 'T'. 7. Field: Key or user ID/user attribute expiration date or empty if none. 8. Field: Used for serial number in crt records (used to be the Local-ID). For UID and UAT records, this is a hash of the user ID contents used to represent that exact user ID. For trust signatures, this is the trust depth seperated by the trust value by a space. 9. Field: Ownertrust (primary public keys only) This is a single letter, but be prepared that additional information may follow in some future versions. For trust signatures with a regular expression, this is the regular expression value, quoted as in field 10. 10. Field: User-ID. The value is quoted like a C string to avoid control characters (the colon is quoted "\x3a"). For a "pub" record this field is not used on --fixed-list-mode. A UAT record puts the attribute subpacket count here, a space, and then the total attribute subpacket size. In gpgsm the issuer name comes here An FPR record stores the fingerprint here. The fingerprint of an revocation key is stored here. 11. Field: Signature class as per RFC-4880. This is a 2 digit hexnumber followed by either the letter 'x' for an exportable signature or the letter 'l' for a local-only signature. The class byte of an revocation key is also given here, 'x' and 'l' is used the same way. IT is not used for X.509. 12. Field: Key capabilities: e = encrypt s = sign c = certify a = authentication A key may have any combination of them in any order. In addition to these letters, the primary key has uppercase versions of the letters to denote the _usable_ capabilities of the entire key, and a potential letter 'D' to indicate a disabled key. 13. Field: Used in FPR records for S/MIME keys to store the fingerprint of the issuer certificate. This is useful to build the certificate path based on certificates stored in the local keyDB; it is only filled if the issuer certificate is available. The root has been reached if this is the same string as the fingerprint. The advantage of using this value is that it is guaranteed to have been been build by the same lookup algorithm as gpgsm uses. For "uid" records this lists the preferences in the same way the gpg's --edit-key menu does. For "sig" records, this is the fingerprint of the key that issued the signature. Note that this is only filled in if the signature verified correctly. Note also that for various technical reasons, this fingerprint is only available if --no-sig-cache is used. 14. Field Flag field used in the --edit menu output: 15. Field Used in sec/sbb to print the serial number of a token (internal protect mode 1002) or a '#' if that key is a simple stub (internal protect mode 1001) All dates are displayed in the format yyyy-mm-dd unless you use the option --fixed-list-mode in which case they are displayed as seconds since Epoch. More fields may be added later, so parsers should be prepared for this. When parsing a number the parser should stop at the first non-number character so that additional information can later be added. If field 1 has the tag "pkd", a listing looks like this: pkd:0:1024:B665B1435F4C2 .... FF26ABB: ! ! !-- the value ! !------ for information number of bits in the value !--------- index (eg. DSA goes from 0 to 3: p,q,g,y) Example for a "tru" trust base record: tru:o:0:1166697654:1:3:1:5 The fields are: 2: Reason for staleness of trust. If this field is empty, then the trustdb is not stale. This field may have multiple flags in it: o: Trustdb is old t: Trustdb was built with a different trust model than the one we are using now. 3: Trust model: 0: Classic trust model, as used in PGP 2.x. 1: PGP trust model, as used in PGP 6 and later. This is the same as the classic trust model, except for the addition of trust signatures. GnuPG before version 1.4 used the classic trust model by default. GnuPG 1.4 and later uses the PGP trust model by default. 4: Date trustdb was created in seconds since 1970-01-01. 5: Date trustdb will expire in seconds since 1970-01-01. 6: Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new key signer (gpg's option --marginals-needed) 7: Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new key signer. (gpg's option --completes-needed) 8: Maximum depth of a certification chain. *gpg's option --max-cert-depth) The "spk" signature subpacket records have the fields: 2: Subpacket number as per RFC-4880 and later. 3: Flags in hex. Currently the only two bits assigned are 1, to indicate that the subpacket came from the hashed part of the signature, and 2, to indicate the subpacket was marked critical. 4: Length of the subpacket. Note that this is the length of the subpacket, and not the length of field 5 below. Due to the need for %-encoding, the length of field 5 may be up to 3x this value. 5: The subpacket data. Printable ASCII is shown as ASCII, but other values are rendered as %XX where XX is the hex value for the byte. Format of the "--status-fd" output ================================== Every line is prefixed with "[GNUPG:] ", followed by a keyword with the type of the status line and a some arguments depending on the type (maybe none); an application should always be prepared to see more arguments in future versions. NEWSIG May be issued right before a signature verification starts. This is useful to define a context for parsing ERROR status messages. No arguments are currently defined. GOODSIG The signature with the keyid is good. For each signature only one of the three codes GOODSIG, BADSIG or ERRSIG will be emitted and they may be used as a marker for a new signature. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if it is available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually also be available for OpenPGP. EXPSIG The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature is expired. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if it is available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually also be available for OpenPGP. EXPKEYSIG The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was made by an expired key. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if it is available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually also be available for OpenPGP. REVKEYSIG The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was made by a revoked key. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if it is available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually also be available for OpenPGP. BADSIG The signature with the keyid has not been verified okay. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if it is available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually also be available for OpenPGP. ERRSIG \ It was not possible to check the signature. This may be caused by a missing public key or an unsupported algorithm. A RC of 4 indicates unknown algorithm, a 9 indicates a missing public key. The other fields give more information about this signature. sig_class is a 2 byte hex-value. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if it is available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually also be available for OpenPGP. Note, that TIMESTAMP may either be a number with seconds since epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence of the letter 'T' inside. VALIDSIG [ ] The signature with the keyid is good. This is the same as GOODSIG but has the fingerprint as the argument. Both status lines are emitted for a good signature. All arguments here are on one long line. sig-timestamp is the signature creation time in seconds after the epoch. expire-timestamp is the signature expiration time in seconds after the epoch (zero means "does not expire"). sig-version, pubkey-algo, hash-algo, and sig-class (a 2-byte hex value) are all straight from the signature packet. PRIMARY-KEY-FPR is the fingerprint of the primary key or identical to the first argument. This is useful to get back to the primary key without running gpg again for this purpose. The primary-key-fpr parameter is used for OpenPGP and not available for CMS signatures. The sig-version as well as the sig class is not defined for CMS and currently set to 0 and 00. Note, that *-TIMESTAMP may either be a number with seconds since epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence of the letter 'T' inside. SIG_ID This is emitted only for signatures of class 0 or 1 which have been verified okay. The string is a signature id and may be used in applications to detect replay attacks of signed messages. Note that only DLP algorithms give unique ids - others may yield duplicated ones when they have been created in the same second. Note, that SIG-TIMESTAMP may either be a number with seconds since epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence of the letter 'T' inside. ENC_TO The message is encrypted to this LONG_KEYID. KEYTYPE is the numerical value of the public key algorithm or 0 if it is not known, KEYLENGTH is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known (which is currently always the case). Gpg prints this line always; Gpgsm only if it knows the certificate. NODATA No data has been found. Codes for what are: 1 - No armored data. 2 - Expected a packet but did not found one. 3 - Invalid packet found, this may indicate a non OpenPGP message. 4 - signature expected but not found You may see more than one of these status lines. UNEXPECTED Unexpected data has been encountered 0 - not further specified 1 TRUST_UNDEFINED TRUST_NEVER TRUST_MARGINAL [0 []] TRUST_FULLY [0 []] TRUST_ULTIMATE [0 []] For good signatures one of these status lines are emitted to indicate the validity of the key used to create the signature. The error token values are currently only emitted by gpgsm. VALIDATION_MODEL describes the algorithm used to check the validity of the key. The defaults are the standard Web of Trust model for gpg and the the standard X.509 model for gpgsm. The defined values are "pgp" for the standard PGP WoT. "shell" for the standard X.509 model. "chain" for the chain model. Note that we use the term "TRUST_" in the status names for historic reasons; we now speak of validity. PKA_TRUST_GOOD PKA_TRUST_BAD Depending on the outcome of the PKA check one of the above status codes is emitted in addition to a TRUST_* status. Without PKA info available or SIGEXPIRED This is deprecated in favor of KEYEXPIRED. KEYEXPIRED The key has expired. expire-timestamp is the expiration time in seconds since Epoch. This status line is not very useful because it will also be emitted for expired subkeys even if this subkey is not used. To check whether a key used to sign a message has expired, the EXPKEYSIG status line is to be used. Note, that TIMESTAMP may either be a number with seconds since epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence of the letter 'T' inside. KEYREVOKED The used key has been revoked by its owner. No arguments yet. BADARMOR The ASCII armor is corrupted. No arguments yet. RSA_OR_IDEA The IDEA algorithms has been used in the data. A program might want to fallback to another program to handle the data if GnuPG failed. This status message used to be emitted also for RSA but this has been dropped after the RSA patent expired. However we can't change the name of the message. SHM_INFO SHM_GET SHM_GET_BOOL SHM_GET_HIDDEN GET_BOOL GET_LINE GET_HIDDEN GOT_IT NEED_PASSPHRASE Issued whenever a passphrase is needed. keytype is the numerical value of the public key algorithm or 0 if this is not applicable, keylength is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known (this is currently always the case). NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM Issued whenever a passphrase for symmetric encryption is needed. NEED_PASSPHRASE_PIN [] Issued whenever a PIN is requested to unlock a card. MISSING_PASSPHRASE No passphrase was supplied. An application which encounters this message may want to stop parsing immediately because the next message will probably be a BAD_PASSPHRASE. However, if the application is a wrapper around the key edit menu functionality it might not make sense to stop parsing but simply ignoring the following BAD_PASSPHRASE. BAD_PASSPHRASE The supplied passphrase was wrong or not given. In the latter case you may have seen a MISSING_PASSPHRASE. GOOD_PASSPHRASE The supplied passphrase was good and the secret key material is therefore usable. DECRYPTION_FAILED The symmetric decryption failed - one reason could be a wrong passphrase for a symmetrical encrypted message. DECRYPTION_OKAY The decryption process succeeded. This means, that either the correct secret key has been used or the correct passphrase for a conventional encrypted message was given. The program itself may return an errorcode because it may not be possible to verify a signature for some reasons. NO_PUBKEY NO_SECKEY The key is not available IMPORT_CHECK This status is emitted in interactive mode right before the "import.okay" prompt. IMPORTED The keyid and name of the signature just imported IMPORT_OK [] The key with the primary key's FINGERPRINT has been imported. Reason flags: 0 := Not actually changed 1 := Entirely new key. 2 := New user IDs 4 := New signatures 8 := New subkeys 16 := Contains private key. The flags may be ORed. IMPORT_PROBLEM [] Issued for each import failure. Reason codes are: 0 := "No specific reason given". 1 := "Invalid Certificate". 2 := "Issuer Certificate missing". 3 := "Certificate Chain too long". 4 := "Error storing certificate". IMPORT_RES Final statistics on import process (this is one long line) FILE_START Start processing a file . indicates the performed operation: 1 - verify 2 - encrypt 3 - decrypt FILE_DONE Marks the end of a file processing which has been started by FILE_START. BEGIN_DECRYPTION END_DECRYPTION Mark the start and end of the actual decryption process. These are also emitted when in --list-only mode. BEGIN_ENCRYPTION END_ENCRYPTION Mark the start and end of the actual encryption process. BEGIN_SIGNING Mark the start of the actual signing process. This may be used as an indication that all requested secret keys are ready for use. DELETE_PROBLEM reason_code Deleting a key failed. Reason codes are: 1 - No such key 2 - Must delete secret key first 3 - Ambigious specification PROGRESS what char cur total Used by the primegen and Public key functions to indicate progress. "char" is the character displayed with no --status-fd enabled, with the linefeed replaced by an 'X'. "cur" is the current amount done and "total" is amount to be done; a "total" of 0 indicates that the total amount is not known. The condition TOATL && CUR == TOTAL may be used to detect the end of an operation. Well known values for WHAT: "pk_dsa" - DSA key generation "pk_elg" - Elgamal key generation "primegen" - Prime generation "need_entropy" - Waiting for new entropy in the RNG "file:XXX" - processing file XXX (note that current gpg versions leave out the "file:" prefix). "tick" - generic tick without any special meaning - useful for letting clients know that the server is still working. "starting_agent" - A gpg-agent was started because it is not running as a daemon. "learncard" Send by the agent and gpgsm while learing the data of a smartcard. "card_busy" A smartcard is still working SIG_CREATED A signature has been created using these parameters. type: 'D' = detached 'C' = cleartext 'S' = standard (only the first character should be checked) class: 2 hex digits with the signature class Note, that TIMESTAMP may either be a number with seconds since epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence of the letter 'T' inside. KEY_CREATED [] A key has been created type: 'B' = primary and subkey 'P' = primary 'S' = subkey The fingerprint is one of the primary key for type B and P and the one of the subkey for S. Handle is an arbitrary non-whitespace string used to match key parameters from batch key creation run. KEY_NOT_CREATED [] The key from batch run has not been created due to errors. SESSION_KEY : The session key used to decrypt the message. This message will only be emitted when the special option --show-session-key is used. The format is suitable to be passed to the option --override-session-key NOTATION_NAME NOTATION_DATA name and string are %XX escaped; the data may be split among several NOTATION_DATA lines. USERID_HINT Give a hint about the user ID for a certain keyID. POLICY_URL string is %XX escaped BEGIN_STREAM END_STREAM Issued by pipemode. INV_RECP INV_SGNR Issued for each unusable recipient/sender. The reasons codes currently in use are: 0 := "No specific reason given". 1 := "Not Found" 2 := "Ambigious specification" 3 := "Wrong key usage" 4 := "Key revoked" 5 := "Key expired" 6 := "No CRL known" 7 := "CRL too old" 8 := "Policy mismatch" 9 := "Not a secret key" 10 := "Key not trusted" 11 := "Missing certificate" (e.g. intermediate or root cert.) Note that for historical reasons the INV_RECP status is also used for gpgsm's SIGNER command where it relates to signer's of course. Newer GnuPG versions are using INV_SGNR; applications should ignore the INV_RECP during the sender's command processing once they have seen an INV_SGNR. We use different code so that we can distinguish them while doing an encrypt+sign. NO_RECP NO_SGNR Issued when no recipients/senders are usable. ALREADY_SIGNED Warning: This is experimental and might be removed at any time. TRUNCATED The output was truncated to MAXNO items. This status code is issued for certain external requests ERROR [] This is a generic error status message, it might be followed by error location specific data. and should not contain spaces. The error code is a either a string commencing with a letter or such a string prefixed with a numerical error code and an underscore; e.g.: "151011327_EOF". ATTRIBUTE This is one long line issued for each attribute subpacket when an attribute packet is seen during key listing. is the fingerprint of the key. is the length of the attribute subpacket. is the attribute type (1==image). / indicates that this is the Nth indexed subpacket of count total subpackets in this attribute packet. and are from the self-signature on the attribute packet. If the attribute packet does not have a valid self-signature, then the timestamp is 0. are a bitwise OR of: 0x01 = this attribute packet is a primary uid 0x02 = this attribute packet is revoked 0x04 = this attribute packet is expired CARDCTRL [] This is used to control smartcard operations. Defined values for WHAT are: 1 = Request insertion of a card. Serialnumber may be given to request a specific card. Used by gpg 1.4 w/o scdaemon. 2 = Request removal of a card. Used by gpg 1.4 w/o scdaemon. 3 = Card with serialnumber detected 4 = No card available. 5 = No card reader available 6 = No card support available PLAINTEXT This indicates the format of the plaintext that is about to be written. The format is a 1 byte hex code that shows the format of the plaintext: 62 ('b') is binary data, 74 ('t') is text data with no character set specified, and 75 ('u') is text data encoded in the UTF-8 character set. The timestamp is in seconds since the epoch. If a filename is available it gets printed as the third argument, percent-escaped as usual. PLAINTEXT_LENGTH This indicates the length of the plaintext that is about to be written. Note that if the plaintext packet has partial length encoding it is not possible to know the length ahead of time. In that case, this status tag does not appear. SIG_SUBPACKET This indicates that a signature subpacket was seen. The format is the same as the "spk" record above. SC_OP_FAILURE [] An operation on a smartcard definitely failed. Currently there is no indication of the actual error code, but application should be prepared to later accept more arguments. Defined values for CODE are: 0 - unspecified error (identically to a missing CODE) 1 - canceled 2 - bad PIN SC_OP_SUCCESS A smart card operaion succeeded. This status is only printed for certain operation and is mostly useful to check whether a PIN change really worked. BACKUP_KEY_CREATED fingerprint fname A backup key named FNAME has been created for the key with KEYID. Format of the "--attribute-fd" output ===================================== When --attribute-fd is set, during key listings (--list-keys, --list-secret-keys) GnuPG dumps each attribute packet to the file descriptor specified. --attribute-fd is intended for use with --status-fd as part of the required information is carried on the ATTRIBUTE status tag (see above). The contents of the attribute data is specified by RFC 4880. For convenience, here is the Photo ID format, as it is currently the only attribute defined: Byte 0-1: The length of the image header. Due to a historical accident (i.e. oops!) back in the NAI PGP days, this is a little-endian number. Currently 16 (0x10 0x00). Byte 2: The image header version. Currently 0x01. Byte 3: Encoding format. 0x01 == JPEG. Byte 4-15: Reserved, and currently unused. All other data after this header is raw image (JPEG) data. Format of the "--list-config" output ==================================== --list-config outputs information about the GnuPG configuration for the benefit of frontends or other programs that call GnuPG. There are several list-config items, all colon delimited like the rest of the --with-colons output. The first field is always "cfg" to indicate configuration information. The second field is one of (with examples): version: the third field contains the version of GnuPG. cfg:version:1.3.5 pubkey: the third field contains the public key algorithmdcaiphers this version of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons. The algorithm numbers are as specified in RFC-4880. cfg:pubkey:1;2;3;16;17 cipher: the third field contains the symmetric ciphers this version of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons. The cipher numbers are as specified in RFC-4880. cfg:cipher:2;3;4;7;8;9;10 digest: the third field contains the digest (hash) algorithms this version of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons. The digest numbers are as specified in RFC-4880. cfg:digest:1;2;3;8;9;10 compress: the third field contains the compression algorithms this version of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons. The algorithm numbers are as specified in RFC-4880. cfg:compress:0;1;2;3 group: the third field contains the name of the group, and the fourth field contains the values that the group expands to, separated by semicolons. For example, a group of: group mynames = paige 0x12345678 joe patti would result in: cfg:group:mynames:patti;joe;0x12345678;paige Key generation ============== See the Libcrypt manual. Unattended key generation ========================= This feature allows unattended generation of keys controlled by a parameter file. To use this feature, you use --gen-key together with --batch and feed the parameters either from stdin or from a file given on the commandline. The format of this file is as follows: o Text only, line length is limited to about 1000 chars. o You must use UTF-8 encoding to specify non-ascii characters. o Empty lines are ignored. o Leading and trailing spaces are ignored. o A hash sign as the first non white space character indicates a comment line. o Control statements are indicated by a leading percent sign, the arguments are separated by white space from the keyword. o Parameters are specified by a keyword, followed by a colon. Arguments are separated by white space. o The first parameter must be "Key-Type", control statements may be placed anywhere. o Key generation takes place when either the end of the parameter file is reached, the next "Key-Type" parameter is encountered or at the control statement "%commit" o Control statements: %echo Print . %dry-run Suppress actual key generation (useful for syntax checking). %commit Perform the key generation. An implicit commit is done at the next "Key-Type" parameter. %pubring %secring Do not write the key to the default or commandline given keyring but to . This must be given before the first commit to take place, duplicate specification of the same filename is ignored, the last filename before a commit is used. The filename is used until a new filename is used (at commit points) and all keys are written to that file. If a new filename is given, this file is created (and overwrites an existing one). Both control statements must be given. %ask-passphrase Enable a mode where the command "passphrase" is ignored and instead the usual passphrase dialog is used. This does not make sense for batch key generation; however the unattended key generation feature is also used by GUIs and this feature relinquishes the GUI from implementing its own passphrase entry code. This is a global option. %no-ask-passphrase Disable the ask-passphrase mode. o The order of the parameters does not matter except for "Key-Type" which must be the first parameter. The parameters are only for the generated keyblock and parameters from previous key generations are not used. Some syntactically checks may be performed. The currently defined parameters are: Key-Type: | Starts a new parameter block by giving the type of the primary key. The algorithm must be capable of signing. This is a required parameter. It may be "default" to use the default one; in this case don't give a Key-Usage and use "default" for the Subkey-Type. Key-Length: Length of the key in bits. The default is returned by running the command "gpg --gpgconf-list". Key-Usage: Space or comma delimited list of key usage, allowed values are "encrypt", "sign", and "auth". This is used to generate the key flags. Please make sure that the algorithm is capable of this usage. Note that OpenPGP requires that all primary keys are capable of certification, so no matter what usage is given here, the "cert" flag will be on. If no Key-Usage is specified and the key-type is not "default", all allowed usages for that particular algorithm are used; if it is not given but "default" is used the usage will be "sign". Subkey-Type: | This generates a secondary key. Currently only one subkey can be handled. "default" is also supported. Subkey-Length: Length of the subkey in bits. The default is returned by running the command "gpg --gpgconf-list". Subkey-Usage: Similar to Key-Usage. Passphrase: If you want to specify a passphrase for the secret key, enter it here. Default is not to use any passphrase. Name-Real: Name-Comment: Name-Email: The 3 parts of a key. Remember to use UTF-8 here. If you don't give any of them, no user ID is created. Expire-Date: |([d|w|m|y]) Set the expiration date for the key (and the subkey). It may either be entered in ISO date format (2000-08-15) or as number of days, weeks, month or years. The special notation "seconds=N" is also allowed to directly give an Epoch value. Without a letter days are assumed. Note that there is no check done on the overflow of the type used by OpenPGP for timestamps. Thus you better make sure that the given value make sense. Although OpenPGP works with time intervals, GnuPG uses an absolute value internally and thus the last year we can represent is 2105. Creation-Date: Set the creation date of the key as stored in the key information and which is also part of the fingerprint calculation. Either a date like "1986-04-26" or a full timestamp like "19860426T042640" may be used. The time is considered to be UTC. If it is not given the current time is used. Preferences: Set the cipher, hash, and compression preference values for this key. This expects the same type of string as "setpref" in the --edit menu. Revoker: : [sensitive] Add a designated revoker to the generated key. Algo is the public key algorithm of the designated revoker (i.e. RSA=1, DSA=17, etc.) Fpr is the fingerprint of the designated revoker. The optional "sensitive" flag marks the designated revoker as sensitive information. Only v4 keys may be designated revokers. Handle: This is an optional parameter only used with the status lines KEY_CREATED and KEY_NOT_CREATED. STRING may be up to 100 characters and should not contain spaces. It is useful for batch key generation to associate a key parameter block with a status line. Keyserver: This is an optional parameter that specifies the preferred keyserver URL for the key. Here is an example on how to create a key: $ cat >foo < ssb 1024g/8F70E2C0 2000-03-09 If you want to create a key with the default algorithms you would use these parameters: %echo Generating a default key Key-Type: default Subkey-Type: default Name-Real: Joe Tester Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase Name-Email: joe@foo.bar Expire-Date: 0 Passphrase: abc %pubring foo.pub %secring foo.sec # Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-) %commit %echo done Layout of the TrustDB ===================== The TrustDB is built from fixed length records, where the first byte describes the record type. All numeric values are stored in network byte order. The length of each record is 40 bytes. The first record of the DB is always of type 1 and this is the only record of this type. FIXME: The layout changed, document it here. Record type 0: -------------- Unused record, can be reused for any purpose. Record type 1: -------------- Version information for this TrustDB. This is always the first record of the DB and the only one with type 1. 1 byte value 1 3 bytes 'gpg' magic value 1 byte Version of the TrustDB (2) 1 byte marginals needed 1 byte completes needed 1 byte max_cert_depth The three items are used to check whether the cached validity value from the dir record can be used. 1 u32 locked flags [not used] 1 u32 timestamp of trustdb creation 1 u32 timestamp of last modification which may affect the validity of keys in the trustdb. This value is checked against the validity timestamp in the dir records. 1 u32 timestamp of last validation [currently not used] (Used to keep track of the time, when this TrustDB was checked against the pubring) 1 u32 record number of keyhashtable [currently not used] 1 u32 first free record 1 u32 record number of shadow directory hash table [currently not used] It does not make sense to combine this table with the key table because the keyid is not in every case a part of the fingerprint. 1 u32 record number of the trusthashtbale Record type 2: (directory record) -------------- Informations about a public key certificate. These are static values which are never changed without user interaction. 1 byte value 2 1 byte reserved 1 u32 LID . (This is simply the record number of this record.) 1 u32 List of key-records (the first one is the primary key) 1 u32 List of uid-records 1 u32 cache record 1 byte ownertrust 1 byte dirflag 1 byte maximum validity of all the user ids 1 u32 time of last validity check. 1 u32 Must check when this time has been reached. (0 = no check required) Record type 3: (key record) -------------- Informations about a primary public key. (This is mainly used to lookup a trust record) 1 byte value 3 1 byte reserved 1 u32 LID 1 u32 next - next key record 7 bytes reserved 1 byte keyflags 1 byte pubkey algorithm 1 byte length of the fingerprint (in bytes) 20 bytes fingerprint of the public key (This is the value we use to identify a key) Record type 4: (uid record) -------------- Informations about a userid We do not store the userid but the hash value of the userid because that is sufficient. 1 byte value 4 1 byte reserved 1 u32 LID points to the directory record. 1 u32 next next userid 1 u32 pointer to preference record 1 u32 siglist list of valid signatures 1 byte uidflags 1 byte validity of the key calculated over this user id 20 bytes ripemd160 hash of the username. Record type 5: (pref record) -------------- This record type is not anymore used. 1 byte value 5 1 byte reserved 1 u32 LID; points to the directory record (and not to the uid record!). (or 0 for standard preference record) 1 u32 next 30 byte preference data Record type 6 (sigrec) ------------- Used to keep track of key signatures. Self-signatures are not stored. If a public key is not in the DB, the signature points to a shadow dir record, which in turn has a list of records which might be interested in this key (and the signature record here is one). 1 byte value 6 1 byte reserved 1 u32 LID points back to the dir record 1 u32 next next sigrec of this uid or 0 to indicate the last sigrec. 6 times 1 u32 Local_id of signatures dir or shadow dir record 1 byte Flag: Bit 0 = checked: Bit 1 is valid (we have a real directory record for this) 1 = valid is set (but may be revoked) Record type 8: (shadow directory record) -------------- This record is used to reserve a LID for a public key. We need this to create the sig records of other keys, even if we do not yet have the public key of the signature. This record (the record number to be more precise) will be reused as the dir record when we import the real public key. 1 byte value 8 1 byte reserved 1 u32 LID (This is simply the record number of this record.) 2 u32 keyid 1 byte pubkey algorithm 3 byte reserved 1 u32 hintlist A list of records which have references to this key. This is used for fast access to signature records which are not yet checked. Note, that this is only a hint and the actual records may not anymore hold signature records for that key but that the code cares about this. 18 byte reserved Record Type 10 (hash table) -------------- Due to the fact that we use fingerprints to lookup keys, we can implement quick access by some simple hash methods, and avoid the overhead of gdbm. A property of fingerprints is that they can be used directly as hash values. (They can be considered as strong random numbers.) What we use is a dynamic multilevel architecture, which combines hashtables, record lists, and linked lists. This record is a hashtable of 256 entries; a special property is that all these records are stored consecutively to make one big table. The hash value is simple the 1st, 2nd, ... byte of the fingerprint (depending on the indirection level). When used to hash shadow directory records, a different table is used and indexed by the keyid. 1 byte value 10 1 byte reserved n u32 recnum; n depends on the record length: n = (reclen-2)/4 which yields 9 for the current record length of 40 bytes. the total number of such record which makes up the table is: m = (256+n-1) / n which is 29 for a record length of 40. To look up a key we use the first byte of the fingerprint to get the recnum from this hashtable and look up the addressed record: - If this record is another hashtable, we use 2nd byte to index this hash table and so on. - if this record is a hashlist, we walk all entries until we found one a matching one. - if this record is a key record, we compare the fingerprint and to decide whether it is the requested key; Record type 11 (hash list) -------------- see hash table for an explanation. This is also used for other purposes. 1 byte value 11 1 byte reserved 1 u32 next next hash list record n times n = (reclen-5)/5 1 u32 recnum For the current record length of 40, n is 7 Record type 254 (free record) --------------- All these records form a linked list of unused records. 1 byte value 254 1 byte reserved (0) 1 u32 next_free GNU extensions to the S2K algorithm =================================== S2K mode 101 is used to identify these extensions. After the hash algorithm the 3 bytes "GNU" are used to make clear that these are extensions for GNU, the next bytes gives the GNU protection mode - 1000. Defined modes are: 1001 - do not store the secret part at all 1002 - a stub to access smartcards (not used in 1.2.x) Other Notes =========== * For packet version 3 we calculate the keyids this way: RSA := low 64 bits of n ELGAMAL := build a v3 pubkey packet (with CTB 0x99) and calculate a rmd160 hash value from it. This is used as the fingerprint and the low 64 bits are the keyid. * Revocation certificates consist only of the signature packet; "import" knows how to handle this. The rationale behind it is to keep them small. OIDs below the GnuPG arc: ========================= 1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2 GnuPG 1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.1 notation 1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.1.1 pkaAddress 1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.12242973 invalid encoded OID Keyserver Message Format ========================= The keyserver may be contacted by a Unix Domain socket or via TCP. The format of a request is: ==== command-tag "Content-length:" digits CRLF ======= Where command-tag is NOOP GET PUT DELETE The format of a response is: ====== "GNUPG/1.0" status-code status-text "Content-length:" digits CRLF ============ followed by bytes of data Status codes are: o 1xx: Informational - Request received, continuing process o 2xx: Success - The action was successfully received, understood, and accepted o 4xx: Client Error - The request contains bad syntax or cannot be fulfilled o 5xx: Server Error - The server failed to fulfill an apparently valid request Documentation on HKP (the http keyserver protocol): A minimalistic HTTP server on port 11371 recognizes a GET for /pks/lookup. The standard http URL encoded query parameters are this (always key=value): - op=index (like pgp -kv), op=vindex (like pgp -kvv) and op=get (like pgp -kxa) - search=. This is a list of words that must occur in the key. The words are delimited with space, points, @ and so on. The delimiters are not searched for and the order of the words doesn't matter (but see next option). - exact=on. This switch tells the hkp server to only report exact matching keys back. In this case the order and the "delimiters" are important. - fingerprint=on. Also reports the fingerprints when used with 'index' or 'vindex' The keyserver also recognizes http-POSTs to /pks/add. Use this to upload keys. A better way to do this would be a request like: /pks/lookup/?op= This can be implemented using Hurd's translator mechanism. However, I think the whole key server stuff has to be re-thought; I have some ideas and probably create a white paper. PK[1&&HACKINGnuW+A A Hacker's Guide to GNUPG ================================ (Some notes on GNUPG internals.) ===> Under construction <======= RFCs ==== 1423 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers. 1489 Registration of a Cyrillic Character Set. 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security. 1991 PGP Message Exchange Formats. 2015 MIME Security with Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). 2144 The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm. 2279 UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646. 2440 OpenPGP. Directory Layout ---------------- ./ Readme, configure ./agent Gpg-agent and related tools ./doc Documentation ./doc Documentation ./g10 Gpg program here called gpg2 ./jnlib Utility functions ./kbx Keybox library ./scd Smartcard daemon ./scripts Scripts needed by configure and others ./sm Gpgsm program Detailed Roadmap ---------------- g10/gpg.c Main module with option parsing and all the stuff you have to do on startup. Also has the exout handler and some helper functions. g10/sign.c Create signature and optionally encrypt g10/parse-packet.c g10/build-packet.c g10/free-packet.c Parsing and creating of OpenPGP message packets. g10/getkey.c Key selection code g10/pkclist.c Build a list of public keys g10/skclist.c Build a list of secret keys g10/ringedit.c Keyring I/O g10/keydb.h g10/keyid.c Helper functions to get the keyid, fingerprint etc. g10/trustdb.c g10/trustdb.h g10/tdbdump.c Management of the trustdb.gpg g10/compress.c Filter to handle compression g10/filter.h Declarations for all filter functions g10/delkey.c Delete a key g10/kbnode.c Helper for the KBNODE linked list g10/main.h Prototypes and some constants g10/mainproc.c Message processing g10/armor.c Ascii armor filter g10/mdfilter.c Filter to calculate hashs g10/textfilter.c Filter to handle CR/LF and trailing white space g10/cipher.c En-/Decryption filter g10/misc.c Utlity functions g10/options.h Structure with all the command line options and related constants g10/openfile.c Create/Open Files g10/tdbio.c I/O handling for the trustdb.gpg g10/tdbio.h g10/hkp.h Keyserver access g10/hkp.c g10/packet.h Defintion of OpenPGP structures. g10/passphrase.c Passphrase handling code g10/pubkey-enc.c g10/seckey-cert.c g10/seskey.c g10/import.c g10/export.c g10/comment.c g10/status.c g10/status.h g10/sign.c g10/plaintext.c g10/encr-data.c g10/encode.c g10/revoke.c g10/keylist.c g10/sig-check.c g10/signal.c g10/helptext.c g10/verify.c g10/decrypt.c g10/keyedit.c g10/dearmor.c g10/keygen.c Memory allocation ----------------- Use only the functions: xmalloc xmalloc_secure xtrymalloc xtrymalloc_secure xcalloc xcalloc_secure xtrycalloc xtrycalloc_secure xrealloc xtryrealloc xstrdup xtrystrdup xfree The *secure versions allocated memory in the secure memory. That is, swapping out of this memory is avoided and is gets overwritten on free. Use this for passphrases, session keys and other sensitive material. This memory set aside for secure memory is linited to a few k. In general the function don't print a memeory message and terminate the process if there is not enough memory available. The "try" versions of the functions return NULL instead. Logging ------- Option parsing --------------- GNUPG does not use getopt or GNU getopt but functions of it's own. See util/argparse.c for details. The advantage of these functions is that it is more easy to display and maintain the help texts for the options. The same option table is also used to parse resource files. What is an IOBUF ---------------- This is the data structure used for most I/O of gnupg. It is similar to System V Streams but much simpler. Because OpenPGP messages are nested in different ways; the use of such a system has big advantages. Here is an example, how it works: If the parser sees a packet header with a partial length, it pushes the block_filter onto the IOBUF to handle these partial length packets: from now on you don't have to worry about this. When it sees a compressed packet it pushes the uncompress filter and the next read byte is one which has already been uncompressed by this filter. Same goes for enciphered packet, plaintext packets and so on. The file g10/encode.c might be a good staring point to see how it is used - actually this is the other way: constructing messages using pushed filters but it may be easier to understand. PK[;mm ChangeLognuW+A2009-12-21 Werner Koch Reelase 2.0.14. 2009-12-08 Werner Koch * configure.ac (USE_DNS_CERT): Support via ADNS. 2009-12-07 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Check for ADNS before checking for the BIND resolver. (USE_ADNS): Fallback macro for PKA and CERT lookups. 2009-09-04 Werner Koch Release 2.0.13. 2009-06-29 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Take care of --without-adns. Suggested by Arfrever Frehtes Taifersar Arahesis. 2009-06-17 Werner Koch Release 2.0.12. 2009-06-05 David Shaw * configure.ac: Remove Camellia restriction. 2009-04-01 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Test for fsync. 2009-03-18 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Test for getrlimit. 2009-03-03 Werner Koch Release 2.0.11. 2009-01-12 Werner Koch Release 2.0.10. 2008-12-09 Werner Koch Release 2.0.10rc1. 2008-10-17 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Use more warning options with modern GCCs. 2008-09-29 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Require libgcrypt 1.4. 2008-08-27 David Shaw * configure.ac: Use printf for the most portable SVN version detection. * configure.ac: Darwin's /bin/sh has a builtin echo that doesn't understand '-n'. Use tr to trim the carriage return instead. 2008-04-23 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Call gl_HEADER_SYS_SOCKET and gl_TYPE_SOCKLEN_T. 2008-04-07 Werner Koch * configure.ac (ADNSLIBS): Test for adns. (GPGKEYS_KDNS): New. 2008-04-01 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Require curl 7.10 (Oct 1 2002) or later as we use curl_version_info(). (AC_INIT): Fix quoting. 2008-03-27 Werner Koch * Makefile.am (dist_doc_DATA): New. Install README. 2008-03-26 Werner Koch Release 2.0.9. 2008-02-19 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Remove --with-pkits-tests. 2008-02-15 Werner Koch * gl/allocsa.h, gl/m4/allocsa.m4: Replace HAVE_LONG_LONG by HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT. 2008-02-15 gettextize * configure.ac (AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION): Bump to 0.17. 2007-12-20 Werner Koch Released 2.0.8. 2007-12-17 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Add treatment for HAVE_LDAP_START_TLS_SA. 2007-12-14 Werner Koch Released 2.0.8rc1. 2007-12-12 Werner Koch * configure.ac (USE_CAMELLIA): Define by new option --enable-camellia. 2007-12-03 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Add test gt_LC_MESSAGES.. 2007-10-01 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Require assuan 1.0.4. 2007-09-14 Werner Koch * configure.ac (GNUPG_LIBASSUAN_VERSION): New. 2007-09-10 Werner Koch Released 2.0.7. 2007-08-27 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Remove remaining support for internal regex. Define DISABLE_REGEX automake conditional. Add option --with-regex. * autogen.sh [--build-w32]: Remove --disable-regex. Use --with-regex. 2007-08-16 Werner Koch Released 2.0.6. 2007-08-08 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Use AC_CANONICAL_HOST and not AC_CANONICAL_TARGET. 2007-07-09 Werner Koch * configure.ac (AM_ICONV): Check for it even when building without NLS. 2007-07-05 Werner Koch Released 2.0.5. * configure.ac: Require libassuan 1.0.2. 2007-07-05 Marcus Brinkmann * configure.ac: Invoke AM_LANGINFO_CODESET. 2007-07-04 Werner Koch * Makefile.am (AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS): Add no-dist-gzip. Switched entire package to GPLv3+. * configure.ac: Require libksba 1.0.2. * COPYING: Updated to GPLv3. * COPYING.LIB: New as jnlib/ uses this license. * gl/: Switched to GPLv3+. * intl/ Removed. * configure.ac (AM_GNU_GETTEXT): Add external flag. (AM_ICONV): New. 2007-07-03 Werner Koch * configure.ac [W32]: Use ws2_32 instead of wsock32. 2007-06-25 Werner Koch * gl/mkdtemp.c (gen_tempname) [MKDIR_TAKES_ONE_ARG]: Avoid compiler warning by using the proper config macro. 2007-06-15 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Call AM_PO_SUBDIRS. (W32SOCKLIBS): New. * autogen.sh: Use = and not == in test to be POSIXly correct. : Disable use of regex. 2007-06-14 Werner Koch * configure.ac [AH_BOTTOM]: Remove the hardwired names of modules. 2007-06-12 Werner Koch * configure.ac [AH_BOTTOM]: Define HTTP_NO_WSASTARTUP. 2007-06-11 Werner Koch * am/cmacros.am (libcommonstd, libcommonpth, libcommonstd_ldadd) (libcommonpth_ldadd): Add macros. 2007-06-06 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Add a few notices message so make browsing of the log file easier. (CC_FOR_BUILD): New. 2007-05-30 Werner Koch * configure.ac [W32]: Do not create a symlink to w32-pth.h. Require the installation of the w32pth package. 2007-05-29 Werner Koch * gl/: Updated to a newer version. 2007-05-24 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Use -Wpointer-arith is possible. 2007-05-15 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Renamed the estream macros. Remove -Wformat-nonliteral. * configure.ac: Call ESTREAM_INIT and define the memory allocators for estream_asprintf. (gl_MODULES): Remove vasprintf. 2007-05-09 Werner Koch Released 2.0.4. 2007-05-07 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Require libgcrypt 1.2.2 to avoid compiler warnings. 2007-05-07 gettextize * configure.ac (AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION): Bump to 0.16.1. 2007-05-07 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Bail out if no C-89 compiler has been found. 2007-05-04 Werner Koch * Makefile.am (DISTCHECK_CONFIGURE_FLAGS): Add --enable-mailto * configure.ac: Require automake 1.10 (AC_CONFIG_FILES): Rename gpgkeys_ to gpg2keys_. (AM_PROG_CC_C_O): New. 2007-03-08 Werner Koch Released 2.0.3. * autogen.sh: Add option --force. 2007-01-31 Werner Koch Released 2.0.2. 2006-11-30 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Save original LIBS when testing for dlopen. 2006-11-28 Werner Koch Released 2.0.1. 2006-11-23 Werner Koch Released 2.0.1rc1. 2006-11-21 Werner Koch * configure.ac [AH_BOTTOM]: Disable PTH soft mapping. (AC_CHECK_SIZEOF): Check for time_t. (BUILD_INCLUDED_LIBINTL): Remove AM_PO_SUBDIRS as it is not required for C. 2006-11-15 Werner Koch * autogen.sh: Add convenience option --build-amd64. 2006-11-14 Werner Koch * configure.ac (HAVE_ASSUAN_SET_IO_MONITOR): Test for it. 2006-11-11 Werner Koch Released 2.0.0. 2006-11-06 Werner Koch Released 1.9.95. 2006-11-03 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Test for pty.h. From Gentoo. 2006-10-24 Werner Koch Released 1.9.94. 2006-10-20 Werner Koch * Makefile.am (stowinstall): Add convenience target. 2006-10-18 Werner Koch * configure.ac: svn revison magic fixes for old bashs. Suggested by Alain Guibert. 2006-10-18 Werner Koch Released 1.9.93. 2006-10-17 Werner Koch * autogen.sh <--build-w32>: Test also for a host "mingw32". * configure.ac: Removed W32LIBS. Use NETLIBS instead. 2006-10-11 Werner Koch Released 1.9.92. * configure.ac: Require libassuan 0.9.3. 2006-10-09 Werner Koch * acinclude.m4: Moved pth check to m4/gnupg-pth.m4. 2006-10-06 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Also check for libassuan's pth version. 2006-10-04 Werner Koch Released 1.9.91. * configure.ac: Require libassuan 0.9.1 which fixes a problem with gpgsm. 2006-09-27 Werner Koch * gl/strsep.h, gl/strsep.c, gl/m4/strsep.m4: Removed. * gl/strpbrk.h, gl/strpbrk.c, gl/m4/strpbrk.m4: Removed. * gl/Makefile.am: Removed module strsep and strpbrk. * configure.ac: Check for strsep in the context of jnlib. Remove check from gl_MODULES. Moved check for timegm into the jnlib context. 2006-09-27 Marcus Brinkmann * Makefile.am: Fix cut & paste error. 2006-09-25 Werner Koch Released 1.9.90. 2006-09-22 Werner Koch * AUTHORS: Add information about used licenses. 2006-09-20 Werner Koch * Makefile.am (dist-hook): Removed distfiles cruft. (SUBDIRS): Added include 2006-09-18 Werner Koch Released 1.9.23. * configure.ac (--enable-agent-only): Donot build tools and doc (--disable-tools,--disable-doc): New. * Makefile.am (SUBDIRS): Allow to conditional build tools and doc. 2006-09-14 Werner Koch Replaced all call gpg_error_from_errno(errno) by gpg_error_from_syserror(). * configure.ac: Build gpg by default. (GNUPG_SYS_SO_PEERCRED): Removed. 2006-09-13 Werner Koch * autogen.sh: Better detection of the cross compiler kit. 2006-09-06 Marcus Brinkmann * configure.ac: New automake conditional RUN_GPG_TESTS. 2006-09-06 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Define _ASSUAN_ONLY_GPG_ERRORS. Require Assuan 0.9 and libgpg-error 1.4 2006-08-31 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Require libksba 1.0 and added API check for it. (GPG_ERR_LOCKED): Removed DECL check as we require 1.2 anyway. (have_libusb): New to give a feedback about CCID support 2006-08-21 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Removed docbook tests. (AC_CONFIG_FILES): Added gpgkeys_test and gpgkeys_mailto. * Makefile.am (DISTCHECK_CONFIGURE_FLAGS): Enable gpg. 2006-08-17 Werner Koch * THANKS: Merged with the 1.4 one. 2006-08-16 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Removed test for capabilities and mlock. 2006-08-15 Werner Koch * Makefile.am (keyserver): Enable building of keyserver helpers. * configure.ac: Merged with the current configure from 1.4.5. Require libgpg-error 1.2 and libksba 0.9.16. 2006-07-29 Marcus Brinkmann * README: Spelling fixes. 2006-07-27 Werner Koch Released 1.9.22. * configure.ac: Call AB_INIT. 2006-07-03 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Test for ksba_dn_teststr. 2006-06-30 Werner Koch * keyserver/: New. Taken from 1.4.4 * Makefile.am (SUBDIRS): Include keyserver/. * configure.ac: Include keyserver/. (FAKE_CURL, GPGKEYS_CURL): New. 2006-06-20 Werner Koch Released 1.9.21. 2006-06-08 Marcus Brinkmann * configure.ac (PTH_LIBS): Add --all to pth-config invocation. 2006-05-24 Werner Koch * configure.ac: New option --disable-optimization taked from 1.4.3. 2006-05-23 Werner Koch * configure.ac (ZLIBS): New for zlib link commands. Add bzip2 support. 2006-05-22 Werner Koch * configure.ac (EXEEXT): New. 2006-04-18 Werner Koch * configure.ac (PK_UID_CACHE_SIZE): New. 2006-04-07 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Use new method to include the SVN revison. Now it is the actual global revision number. 2005-12-20 Werner Koch Released 1.9.20. 2005-11-28 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Append the revision to the version string. 2005-11-13 Werner Koch * am/cmacros.am (-DGNUPG_SYSCONFDIR): Define it. 2005-11-11 Werner Koch * configure.ac (NEED_KSBA_VERSION: Require 0.9.13. 2005-09-12 Werner Koch Released 1.9.19. 2005-08-01 Werner Koch Released 1.9.18. * configure.ac: Require libksba 0.9.12 to match new features in gpgsm. 2005-06-20 Werner Koch Released 1.9.17. 2005-06-02 Werner Koch * configure.ac (HAVE_PTH): Define as alias for USE_GNU_PTH. It is used by common/estream.c. 2005-06-01 Werner Koch * configure.ac (gl_INIT): Add gnulib stuff. (fseeko, ftello, ttyname, isascii): Replaced the AC_REPLACE_FUNCS by a simple check. (putc_unlocked): Removed check. Not used. (strsep, mkdtemp, asprintf): Replaced checks by gnulib checks. (xsize): Added will probably come handy soon. (CFLAGS): Use -Wformat-security instead of -Wformat-nonliteral. Add --Wno-format-y2k. * gl/, gl/m4/: New. 2005-05-15 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Remove option --disable-threads; require the use of GNU Pth. 2005-04-27 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Removed OpenSC detection and options. * acinclude.m4: Ditto. 2005-04-21 Werner Koch Released 1.9.16. * configure.ac: Do not build gpg by default. 2005-04-20 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Test whether GPG_ERR_LOCKED is declared and provide a replacement if not. 2005-04-15 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Require libksba 0.9.11. 2005-04-15 Marcus Brinkmann * configure.ac: Check for /usr/bin/shred and define SHRED. * configure.ac: Add --enable-symcryptrun, disabled by default. Define automake variable BUILD_SYMCRYPTRUN. Check for openpty -lutil, define LIBUTIL_LIBS. 2005-03-03 Werner Koch * acinclude.m4 (GNUPG_PTH_VERSION_CHECK): Accidently used --ldflags instead of --cflags. Reported by Kazu Yamamoto. 2005-02-03 Werner Koch * AUTHORS: Copied from 1.4 and edited to refelct the changes in 1.9. 2005-01-17 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Make --without-included-regex work as expected. Fixed FTP location info for some libraries. 2005-01-13 Werner Koch Released 1.9.15. * acinclude.m4 (GNUPG_PTH_VERSION_CHECK): Link a simple test program to see whether the installation is sane. 2005-01-07 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Require gpg-error 1.0. 2005-01-04 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Remove hack not to build gpg2 for W32. * autogen.sh : Pass option --disable-gpg instead. 2004-12-22 Werner Koch Released 1.9.14. 2004-12-20 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Add PATHSEP_C and PATHSEP_S. For W32 let all directories default to c:/gnupg. Require libassuan 0.6.9. 2004-12-18 Werner Koch * configure.ac (AH_BOTTOM): Define EXEEXT_S. * autogen.sh: Updated --build-w32 feature. 2004-12-15 Werner Koch * Makefile.am (SUBDIRS) [W32]: Do not build in tests/. * acinclude.m4: Add proper macro name quoting for use with automake 1.9. * configure.ac: Add replacement check for ttyname. Removed support for a included zlib. 2004-12-06 Werner Koch * configure.ac (have_w32_system): New. Disable Pth checks for W32. Link jnlib/w32-pth.h to pth.h. 2004-12-03 Werner Koch Released 1.9.13. 2004-11-26 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Replace strsep. Replaced use of "target" by "host". 2004-10-22 Werner Koch Released 1.9.12. * Makefile.am (AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS): Set option to create bzip2 tarball. 2004-10-01 Werner Koch Released 1.9.11. 2004-09-30 Werner Koch * README: Minor updates. 2004-09-30 gettextize * configure.ac (AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION): Bump to 0.14.1. 2004-08-16 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Build Makefile for tests/pkits. New option --with-pkits-tests. 2004-08-05 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Changed tests for libusb to also suuport the stable version 0.1.x. 2004-07-22 Werner Koch Released 1.9.10. * configure.ac: Define AM conditional HAVE_OPENSC. 2004-07-21 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Don't set DIE to no after it might has been set to yes. 2004-07-20 Werner Koch * Makefile.am (sm): Build kbx only if gpgsm is to be build. 2004-07-20 Werner Koch * configure.ac: New option --enable-agent-only. 2004-06-08 Werner Koch Released 1.9.9. 2004-06-06 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Require libksba 0.9.7. 2004-04-29 Werner Koch Released 1.9.8. 2004-04-20 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Remove the fopencookie test. We don't need the dummy function because we conditionally use fopencookie, fpencookie or a replacement at place. 2004-04-02 Thomas Schwinge * autogen.sh: Added ACLOCAL_FLAGS. 2004-04-06 Werner Koch Released 1.9.7. * configure.ac: Require libgcrypt 1.1.94. Introduce PACKAGE_GT and set it to gnupg2. 2004-03-23 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Define SAFE_VERSION_DASH and SAFE_VERSION_DOT. 2004-03-09 Werner Koch * configure.ac (NEED_GPG_ERROR_VERSION): Set to 0.7. 2004-03-06 Werner Koch Released 1.9.6. * configure.ac: Check the Libgcrypt API. 2004-02-25 Werner Koch * configure.ac: New option --disable-threads to inhibit unintentional builds without Pth. 2004-02-21 Werner Koch Released 1.9.5. 2004-02-20 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Fixed URLs in the notice messages. 2004-02-18 Werner Koch * acinclude.m4: Removed macros to detect gpg-error, libgcrypt, libassuan and ksba as they are now distributed in m4/. 2004-02-13 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Require libksba 0.9.4 and libgcrypt 1.1.92. 2004-02-12 Werner Koch * autogen.sh: Removed cruft from debugging. * am/cmacros.am: New. 2004-02-11 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Removed the need for g10defs.h. Reworked the --with-foo-pgm stuff. * autogen.sh (check_version): Removed bashism and simplified. * acinclude.m4 (AM_PATH_OPENSC): Kludge to avoid error output for a bad opensc-config. 2004-01-30 Werner Koch Released 1.9.4. * configure.ac: Require libksba 0.9.3 due to another bug fix there. 2004-01-29 Werner Koch * README: Updated. * configure.ac: Require libksba 0.9.2 due to bug fixes. 2004-01-24 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Now requires libassuan 0.6.3. 2003-12-23 Werner Koch Released 1.9.3. * README-alpha: Removed. * configure.ac, Makefile.am: Add the tests and tools directories. 2003-12-19 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Now require libgcrypt 1.1.91 to help testing the latest libgcrypt changes. Requires libksab 0.9.1. 2003-12-17 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Requires now libassuan 0.6.2. (CFLAGS): Add --Wformat-noliteral in gcc mode. 2003-12-16 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Check for funopen and fopencookie as part of the jnlib checks. 2003-12-09 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Add a min_automake_version. * README.CVS: New. * autogen.sh: Revamped except for the --build-w32 hack. * Makefile.am: Add README.CVS 2003-11-17 Werner Koch Release 1.9.2. * configure.ac: Requires now libassuan 0.6.1. 2003-10-31 Werner Koch * configure.ac (NEED_KSBA_VERSION): Set to 0.9.0 due the changed time interface. 2003-10-21 Werner Koch * configure.ac (PRINTABLE_OS_NAME): Remove special case for The Hurd; Robert Millan reported that the uname test is now sufficient. 2003-10-01 Werner Koch * configure.ac (AH_BOTTOM): Define GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION. 2003-09-23 Werner Koch Merged most of David Shaw's changes in 1.3 since 2003-06-03. * configure.ac: Drop all TIGER/192 support. (uint64_t): Check for UINT64_C to go along with uint64_t. (getaddrinfo): Check for it. (sigset_t): Check for sigset_t and struct sigaction. This is for Forte c89 on Solaris which seems to define only the function call half of the two pairs by default. (W32LIBS): Include wsock32 in W32LIBS. This is different from NETLIBS so we don't need to force other platforms to pull in the netlibs when they aren't actually needed. 2003-09-06 Werner Koch Released 1.9.1. * configure.ac: Require newer versions of some libraries. 2003-09-02 Werner Koch * configure.ac (HAVE_LIBUSB): Added a simple test for libusb. 2003-08-19 Marcus Brinkmann * configure.ac (AM_PATH_GPG_ERROR): Add missing comma in invocation. 2003-08-06 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Check for libgpg-error. Print infos about missing libraries more nicely. * acinclude.m4 (AM_PATH_GPG_ERROR): Added. 2003-08-05 Werner Koch Released 1.9.0. * configure.ac (GNUPG_DEFAULT_HONMEDIR): Changed back to ~/.gnupg. 2003-07-31 Werner Koch * Makefile.am (DISTCLEANFILES): Add g10defs.h 2003-06-18 Werner Koch * configure.ac (GNUPG_DEFAULT_HOMEDIR): Changed temporary to .gnupg2 to avoid accidential use with production keys. 2003-06-11 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Merged all stuff from current 1.3 version in. * acinclude.m4: Merged required macros from current 1.2 version in. 2003-06-04 Werner Koch * configure.ac, Makefile.am: Enable building of gpg. 2003-04-29 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Build a limited version of scdaemon if libopensc is not available. * configure.ac (ALL_LINUGAS): Removed. * Makefile.am (ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS): New. * configure.ac (AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION): New. Set to 0.11.5. 2003-04-29 gettextize * Makefile.am (SUBDIRS): Add m4. (ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS): New variable. (EXTRA_DIST): Add scripts/config.rpath. * configure.ac (AC_CONFIG_FILES): Add m4/Makefile. 2003-04-29 Werner Koch * assuan/ : Removed. We now use libassuan. * Makefile.am (SUBDIRS): Removed assuan * configure.ac: Check for libassuan. 2003-01-09 Werner Koch * configure.ac (GNUPG_PROTECT_TOOL): New option --with-protect-tool. (NEED_KSBA_VERSION): Does now require 0.4.6. * README: Noted where to find gpg-protect-tool. 2002-10-31 Neal H. Walfield * configure.ac: Check for flockfile and funlockfile. Check for isascii and putc_unlocked replacing them if not found. * configure.ac (PTH_LIBS): If pth is found, add the output of `$PTH_CONFIG --ldflags`, not just `$PTH_CONFIG --libs`. 2002-10-19 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Bumped version number to 1.9.0-cvs. NewPG (Aegypten project) to GnuPG merge. 2002-09-20 Werner Koch Released 0.9.2. 2002-09-05 Neal H. Walfield * configure.ac: Check for makeinfo. 2002-09-03 Neal H. Walfield * autogen.sh (have_version): New function. Generalize and simplify logic for finding and determining the versions of GNU programs. Use it. 2002-08-23 Werner Koch Released 0.9.1. * acinclude.m4 (AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT): Updated from Libgcrypt. (AM_PATH_OPENSC): Strip non-digits from the micro version. 2002-08-21 Werner Koch Released 0.9.0. * configure.ac: Changed the default homedir to .gnupg. * README-alpha: Removed. 2002-08-19 Werner Koch * acinclude.m4: Removed -lpcsclite from KSBA_LIBS; copy+paste bug. 2002-08-13 Werner Koch * acinclude.m4 (AM_PATH_OPENSC, AM_PATH_KSBA): New. * configure.ac: Use them. 2002-08-10 Werner Koch Released 0.3.10. * configure.ac (NEED_LIBKSBA_VERSION): Require 0.4.4. Add support for gettext. 2002-07-22 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Check for ftello and provide a replacement. 2002-07-01 Werner Koch Released 0.3.9. * README: Short note on how to export in pkcs-12 format. 2002-06-29 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Define --with options to set the default location of the agent, scdaemon, pinentry and dirmngr. 2002-06-27 Werner Koch * README: Short blurb on how to import a PKCS-12 file. * configure.ac (AH_BOTTOM): New to define some constants. 2002-06-25 Werner Koch Released 0.3.8. * configure.ac (NEED_LIBGCRYPT_VERSION): Set to 1.1.8. 2002-06-12 Werner Koch * configure.ac (NEED_LIBKSBA_VERSION): We need 0.4.3 now. 2002-06-04 Werner Koch Released 0.3.7. 2002-05-21 Werner Koch * configure.ac: We now require libgcrypt 1.1.7 and libksba 0.4.2. 2002-05-14 Werner Koch * doc/: New * configure.ac, Makefile.am: Added doc/ 2002-05-03 Werner Koch Released 0.3.6. 2002-04-25 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Check for setlocale. 2002-04-24 Marcus Brinkmann * configure.ac: Check for locale.h. 2002-04-15 Werner Koch Released 0.3.5. * NEWS: Started to describe release notes. * configure.ac (NEED_LIBKSBA_VERSION, NEED_LIBGCRYPT_VERSION): Defined 2002-04-01 Werner Koch Released 0.3.4. 2002-03-18 Werner Koch Released 0.3.3. 2002-03-08 Werner Koch * README: Add some explanation on how to specify a user ID. 2002-03-06 Werner Koch Released 0.3.2. 2002-03-04 Werner Koch Released 0.3.1. * README: Explained some options and files. 2002-02-14 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Fixed status messages related to presence of Pth. 2002-02-13 Werner Koch * acinclude.m4 (GNUPG_SYS_SO_PEERCRED): New. * configure.ac: use it. 2002-02-12 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Check for PTH. Provide replacement fucntions for apsrintf and fopencookie. * acinclude.m4 (GNUPG_PTH_VERSION_CHECK): New. 2002-02-07 Werner Koch Released 0.3.0. * configure.ac: Require libgcrypt 1.1.6. 2002-02-01 Marcus Brinkmann * configure.ac (KSBA_CONFIG): Remove superfluous x in front of variable. 2002-01-26 Werner Koch * configure.ac: Add options to disable the build of some programs and print a configure status at the end. * acinclude.m4 (GNUPG_BUILD_PROGRAM): New. * scd/ : New. Added to Makefile and configure. * configure.ac: Check for libopensc * Makefile.am: Build scd only when libopensc is available 2002-01-23 Werner Koch * configure.ac (mkdtemp): See whether we have to provide a replacement. 2001-12-18 Werner Koch Released 0.0.0. 2001-12-17 Werner Koch * acinclude.m4: Add AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT macro. * configure.ac: and use it here. Figure out the location of libksba 2001-12-15 Werner Koch * configure.ac (missing_dir): Bail out if asprintf and fopencookie are not available. 2001-12-04 Werner Koch * configure.ac (HAVE_JNLIB_LOGGING): always define it. Copyright 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. PK[0OpenPGPnuW+A GnuPG and OpenPGP ================= See RFC2440 for a description of OpenPGP. We have an annotated version of this RFC online: http://www.gnupg.org/rfc2440.html Compatibility Notes =================== GnuPG (>=1.0.3) is in compliance with RFC2440 despite these exceptions: * (9.2) states that IDEA SHOULD be implemented. This is not done due to patent problems. All MAY features are implemented with this exception: * multi-part armored messages are not supported. MIME (rfc2015) should be used instead. Most of the OPTIONAL stuff is implemented. There are a couple of options which can be used to override some RFC requirements. This is always mentioned with the description of that options. A special format of partial packet length exists for v3 packets which can be considered to be in compliance with RFC1991; this format is only created if a special option is active. GnuPG uses a S2K mode of 101 for GNU extensions to the secret key protection algorithms. This number is not defined in OpenPGP, but given the fact that this number is in a range which used at many other places in OpenPGP for private/experimenat algorithm identifiers, this should be not a so bad choice. The 3 bytes "GNU" are used to identify this as a GNU extension - see the file DETAILS for a definition of the used data formats. Some Notes on OpenPGP / PGP Compatibility: ========================================== * PGP 5.x does not accept V4 signatures for anything other than key material. The GnuPG option --force-v3-sigs mimics this behavior. * PGP 5.x does not recognize the "five-octet" lengths in new-format headers or in signature subpacket lengths. * PGP 5.0 rejects an encrypted session key if the keylength differs from the S2K symmetric algorithm. This is a bug in its validation function. * PGP 5.0 does not handle multiple one-pass signature headers and trailers. Signing one will compress the one-pass signed literal and prefix a V3 signature instead of doing a nested one-pass signature. * When exporting a private key, PGP 2.x generates the header "BEGIN PGP SECRET KEY BLOCK" instead of "BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK". All previous versions ignore the implied data type, and look directly at the packet data type. * In a clear-signed signature, PGP 5.0 will figure out the correct hash algorithm if there is no "Hash:" header, but it will reject a mismatch between the header and the actual algorithm used. The "standard" (i.e. Zimmermann/Finney/et al.) version of PGP 2.x rejects the "Hash:" header and assumes MD5. There are a number of enhanced variants of PGP 2.6.x that have been modified for SHA-1 signatures. * PGP 5.0 can read an RSA key in V4 format, but can only recognize it with a V3 keyid, and can properly use only a V3 format RSA key. * Neither PGP 5.x nor PGP 6.0 recognize ElGamal Encrypt and Sign keys. They only handle ElGamal Encrypt-only keys. Parts of this document are taken from: ====================================== OpenPGP Message Format draft-ietf-openpgp-formats-07.txt Copyright 1998 by The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved. This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English. The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. PK[+tAUTHORSnuW+AProgram: GnuPG Homepage: http://www.gnupg.org Maintainer: Werner Koch Bug reports: http://bugs.gnupg.org Security related bug reports: License: GPLv3+ Authors ======= Ales Nyakhaychyk Translations [be] Birger Langkjer Translations [da] Maxim Britov Translations [ru] Daniel Resare Translations [sv] Per Tunedal Translations [sv] Daniel Nylander Translations [sv] Daiki Ueno Assigns Past and Future Changes. (changed:passphrase.c and related code) David Shaw Assigns past and future changes. (all in keyserver/, a lot of changes in g10/ see the ChangeLog, bug fixes here and there) Dokianakis Theofanis Translations [el] Edmund GRIMLEY EVANS Translations [eo] Florian Weimer Assigns past and future changes (changed:g10/parse-packet.c, include/iobuf.h, util/iobuf.c) g10 Code GmbH Assigns past and future changes (all work since 2001 as indicated by mail addresses in ChangeLogs) Gaël Quéri Translations [fr] (fixed a lot of typos) Gregory Steuck Translations [ru] Nagy Ferenc László Translations [hu] Ivo Timmermans Translations [nl] Jacobo Tarri'o Barreiro Translations [gl] Janusz Aleksander Urbanowicz Translations [pl] Jakub Bogusz Translations [pl] Jedi Lin Translations [zh-tw] Jouni Hiltunen Translations [fi] Tommi Vainikainen Translations [fi] Laurentiu Buzdugan Translations [ro] Magda Procha'zkova' Translations [cs] Michael Roth Assigns changes. (wrote cipher/des.c., changes and bug fixes all over the place) Michal Majer Translations [sk] Marco d'Itri Translations [it] Marcus Brinkmann (gpgconf and fixes all over the place) Matthew Skala Disclaimer (wrote cipher/twofish.c) Moritz Schulte (ssh support gpg-agent) Niklas Hernaeus Disclaimer (weak key patches) Nilgun Belma Buguner Translations [tr] Nils Ellmenreich Assigns past and future changes (configure.in, cipher/rndlinux.c, FAQ) Paul Eggert (configuration macros for LFS) Pavel I. Shajdo Translations [ru] (man pages) Pedro Morais Translations [pt_PT] Petr Pisar Translations [cs] Rémi Guyomarch Assigns past and future changes. (g10/compress.c, g10/encr-data.c, g10/free-packet.c, g10/mdfilter.c, g10/plaintext.c, util/iobuf.c) Stefan Bellon Assigns past and future changes. (All patches to support RISC OS) Timo Schulz Assigns past and future changes. (util/w32reg.c, g10/passphrase.c, g10/hkp.c) Tedi Heriyanto Translations [id] Thiago Jung Bauermann Translations [pt_BR] Rafael Caetano dos Santos Translations [pt_BR] Toomas Soome Translations [et] Urko Lusa Translations [es_ES] Walter Koch Translations [de] Werner Koch Assigns GNU Privacy Guard and future changes. (started the whole thing, wrote the S/MIME extensions, the smartcard daemon and the gpg-agent) Yosiaki IIDA Translations [ja] Other authors ============= The files common/libestream.[ch] are maintained as a separate project by g10 Code GmbH. These files, as used here, are considered part of GnuPG. The RPM specs file scripts/gnupg.spec has been contributed by several people. The function build_argv in agent/w32main.c is based on code from Alexandre Julliard. The gpg-zip documentation is based on the manpage for gpg-zip, written by Colin Tuckley and Daniel Leidert for the GNU/Debian distribution. Copyright ========= GnuPG is distributed under the GNU General Public License, version 2 or later. A few files are under the Lesser General Public License, a few other files carry the all permissive license note as found at the bottom of this file. Certain files in keyserver/ allow one specific exception: In addition, as a special exception, the Free Software Foundation gives permission to link the code of the keyserver helper tools: gpgkeys_ldap, gpgkeys_curl and gpgkeys_hkp with the OpenSSL project's "OpenSSL" library (or with modified versions of it that use the same license as the "OpenSSL" library), and distribute the linked executables. You must obey the GNU General Public License in all respects for all of the code used other than "OpenSSL". If you modify this file, you may extend this exception to your version of the file, but you are not obligated to do so. If you do not wish to do so, delete this exception statement from your version. Note that the gpgkeys_* binaries are currently installed under the name gpg2keys_*. ========= Copyright 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. PK[%  READMEnuW+A The GNU Privacy Guard 2 ========================= Version 2.0 Copyright 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. INTRODUCTION ============ GnuPG is GNU's tool for secure communication and data storage. It can be used to encrypt data and to create digital signatures. It includes an advanced key management facility and is compliant with the proposed OpenPGP Internet standard as described in RFC2440 and the S/MIME standard as described by several RFCs. GnuPG is distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License. See the file COPYING for details. GnuPG works best on GNU/Linux or *BSD systems. Most other Unices are also supported but are not as well tested as the Free Unices. GnuPG 2.0 is the stable version of GnuPG integrating support for OpenPGP and S/MIME. It does not conflict with an installed 1.4 OpenPGP-only version. BUILD INSTRUCTIONS ================== GnuPG 2.0 depends on the following packages: libgpg-error (ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgpg-error/) libgcrypt (ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/) libksba (ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libksba/) libassuan < 2.0 (ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libassuan/) You also need the Pinentry package for most function of GnuPG; however it is not a build requirement. Pinentry is available at ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/pinentry/ . You should get the latest versions of course, the GnuPG configure script complains if a version is not sufficient. After building and installing the above packages in the order as given above, you may now continue with GnuPG installation (you may also just try to build GnuPG to see whether your already installed versions are sufficient). As with all packages, you just have to do ./configure make make install (Before doing install you might need to become root.) If everything succeeds, you have a working GnuPG with support for S/MIME and smartcards. Note that there is no binary gpg but a gpg2 so that this package won't conflict with a GnuPG 1.4 installation. gpg2 behaves just like gpg. In case of problem please ask on gnupg-users@gnupg.org for advise. Note that the PKITS tests are always skipped unless you copy the PKITS test data file into the tests/pkits directory. DOCUMENTATION ============= The complete documentation is in the texinfo manual named `gnupg.info'. Run "info gnupg" to read it. If you want a a printable copy of the manual, change to the "doc" directory and enter "make pdf" For a HTML version enter "make html" and point your browser to gnupg.html/index.html. Standard man pages for all components are provided as well. An online version of the manual is available at http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/ . A version of the manual pertaining to the current development snapshot is at http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg-devel/ . GNUPG 1.4 AND GNUPG 2.0 ======================= GnuPG 2.0 is a newer version of GnuPG with additional support for S/MIME. It has a different design philosophy that splits functionality up into several modules. Both versions may be installed simultaneously without any conflict (gpg is called gpg2 in GnuPG 2). In fact, the gpg version from GnuPG 1.4 is able to make use of the gpg-agent as included in GnuPG 2 and allows for seamless passphrase caching. The advantage of GnuPG 1.4 is its smaller size and no dependency on other modules at run and build time. HOW TO GET MORE INFORMATION =========================== The primary WWW page is "http://www.gnupg.org" The primary FTP site is "ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/" See http://www.gnupg.org/download/mirrors.html for a list of mirrors and use them if possible. You may also find GnuPG mirrored on some of the regular GNU mirrors. We have some mailing lists dedicated to GnuPG: gnupg-announce@gnupg.org For important announcements like new versions and such stuff. This is a moderated list and has very low traffic. Do not post to this list. gnupg-users@gnupg.org For general user discussion and help (English). gnupg-de@gnupg.org German speaking counterpart of gnupg-users. gnupg-ru@gnupg.org Russian speaking counterpart of gnupg-users. gnupg-devel@gnupg.org GnuPG developers main forum. You subscribe to one of the list by sending mail with a subject of "subscribe" to x-request@gnupg.org, where x is the name of the mailing list (gnupg-announce, gnupg-users, etc.). An archive of the mailing lists is available at . Please direct bug reports to http://bugs.gnupg.org or post them direct to the mailing list . Please direct questions about GnuPG to the users mailing list or one of the pgp newsgroups; please do not direct questions to one of the authors directly as we are busy working on improvements and bug fixes. The English and German mailing lists are watched by the authors and we try to answer questions when time allows us to do so. Commercial grade support for GnuPG is available; please see . This file is Free Software; as a special exception the authors gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. For conditions of the whole package, please see the file COPYING. This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. PK[w faq.htmlnuW+A GnuPG FAQ

GnuPG Frequently Asked Questions

Version: 1.6.3
Last-Modified: Jul 30, 2003
Maintained-by: David D. Scribner, <faq 'at' gnupg.org>

This is the GnuPG FAQ. The latest HTML version is available here.

The index is generated automatically, so there may be errors. Not all questions may be in the section they belong to. Suggestions about how to improve the structure of this FAQ are welcome.

Please send additions and corrections to the maintainer. It would be most convenient if you could provide the answer to be included here as well. Your help is very much appreciated!

Please, don't send message like "This should be a FAQ - what's the answer?". If it hasn't been asked before, it isn't a FAQ. In that case you could search in the mailing list archive.


1. GENERAL

  • 1.1) What is GnuPG?
  • 1.2) Is GnuPG compatible with PGP?
  • 1.3) Is GnuPG free to use for personal or commercial use?
  • 1.4) What conventions are used in this FAQ?

    2. SOURCES of INFORMATION

  • 2.1) Where can I find more information on GnuPG?
  • 2.2) Where do I get GnuPG?

    3. INSTALLATION

  • 3.1) Which OSes does GnuPG run on?
  • 3.2) Which random data gatherer should I use?
  • 3.3) How do I include support for RSA and IDEA?

    4. USAGE

  • 4.1) What is the recommended key size?
  • 4.2) Why does it sometimes take so long to create keys?
  • 4.3) And it really takes long when I work on a remote system. Why?
  • 4.4) What is the difference between options and commands?
  • 4.5) I can't delete a user ID on my secret keyring because it has already been deleted on my public keyring. What can I do?
  • 4.6) I can't delete my secret key because the public key disappeared. What can I do?
  • 4.7) What are trust, validity and ownertrust?
  • 4.8) How do I sign a patch file?
  • 4.9) Where is the "encrypt-to-self" option?
  • 4.10) How can I get rid of the Version and Comment headers in armored messages?
  • 4.11) What does the "You are using the xxxx character set." mean?
  • 4.12) How can I get list of key IDs used to encrypt a message?
  • 4.13) Why can't I decrypt files encrypted as symmetrical-only (-c) with a version of GnuPG prior to 1.0.1.
  • 4.14) How can I use GnuPG in an automated environment?
  • 4.15) Which email-client can I use with GnuPG?
  • 4.16) Can't we have a gpg library?
  • 4.17) I have successfully generated a revocation certificate, but I don't understand how to send it to the key servers.
  • 4.18) How do I put my keyring in a different directory?
  • 4.19) How do I verify signed packages?
  • 4.20) How do I export a keyring with only selected signatures (keys)?
  • 4.21) I still have my secret key, but lost my public key. What can I do?
  • 4.22) Clearsigned messages sent from my web-mail account have an invalid signature. Why?

    5. COMPATIBILITY ISSUES

  • 5.1) How can I encrypt a message with GnuPG so that PGP is able to decrypt it?
  • 5.2) How do I migrate from PGP 2.x to GnuPG?
  • 5.3) (removed)
  • 5.4) Why is PGP 5.x not able to encrypt messages with some keys?
  • 5.5) Why is PGP 5.x not able to verify my messages?
  • 5.6) How do I transfer owner trust values from PGP to GnuPG?
  • 5.7) PGP does not like my secret key.
  • 5.8) GnuPG no longer installs a ~/.gnupg/options file. Is it missing?
  • 5.9) How do you export GnuPG keys for use with PGP?

    6. PROBLEMS and ERROR MESSAGES

  • 6.1) Why do I get "gpg: Warning: using insecure memory!"
  • 6.2) Large File Support doesn't work ...
  • 6.3) In the edit menu the trust values are not displayed correctly after signing uids. Why?
  • 6.4) What does "skipping pubkey 1: already loaded" mean?
  • 6.5) GnuPG 1.0.4 doesn't create ~/.gnupg ...
  • 6.6) An Elgamal signature does not verify anymore since version 1.0.2 ...
  • 6.7) Old versions of GnuPG can't verify Elgamal signatures
  • 6.8) When I use --clearsign, the plain text has sometimes extra dashes in it - why?
  • 6.9) What is the thing with "can't handle multiple signatures"?
  • 6.10) If I submit a key to a keyserver, nothing happens ...
  • 6.11) I get "gpg: waiting for lock ..."
  • 6.12) Older gpg binaries (e.g., 1.0) have problems with keys from newer gpg binaries ...
  • 6.13) With 1.0.4, I get "this cipher algorithm is deprecated ..."
  • 6.14) Some dates are displayed as ????-??-??. Why?
  • 6.15) I still have a problem. How do I report a bug?
  • 6.16) Why doesn't GnuPG support X.509 certificates?
  • 6.17) Why do national characters in my user ID look funny?
  • 6.18) I get 'sed' errors when running ./configure on Mac OS X ...
  • 6.19) Why does GnuPG 1.0.6 bail out on keyrings used with 1.0.7?
  • 6.20) I upgraded to GnuPG version 1.0.7 and now it takes longer to load my keyrings. What can I do?
  • 6.21) Doesn't a fully trusted user ID on a key prevent warning messages when encrypting to other IDs on the key?
  • 6.22) I just compiled GnuPG from source on my GNU/Linux RPM-based system and it's not working. Why?

    7. ADVANCED TOPICS

  • 7.1) How does this whole thing work?
  • 7.2) Why are some signatures with an ELG-E key valid?
  • 7.3) How does the whole trust thing work?
  • 7.4) What kind of output is this: "key C26EE891.298, uid 09FB: ...."?
  • 7.5) How do I interpret some of the informational outputs?
  • 7.6) Are the header lines of a cleartext signature part of the signed material?
  • 7.7) What is the list of preferred algorithms?
  • 7.8) How do I change the list of preferred algorithms?
  • 7.9) How can I import all the missing signer keys?

    8. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


  • 1. GENERAL

    1.1) What is GnuPG?

    GnuPG stands for GNU Privacy Guard and is GNU's tool for secure communication and data storage. It can be used to encrypt data and to create digital signatures. It includes an advanced key management facility and is compliant with the proposed OpenPGP Internet standard as described in RFC 2440. As such, it is aimed to be compatible with PGP from PGP Corp. and other OpenPGP tools

    1.2) Is GnuPG compatible with PGP?

    In general, yes. GnuPG and newer PGP releases should be implementing the OpenPGP standard. But there are some interoperability problems. See question 5.1 for details.

    1.3) Is GnuPG free to use for personal or commercial use?

    Yes. GnuPG is part of the GNU family of tools and applications built and provided in accordance with the Free Software Foundation (FSF) General Public License (GPL). Therefore the software is free to copy, use, modify and distribute in accordance with that license. Please read the file titled COPYING that accompanies the application for more information.

    1.4) What conventions are used in this FAQ?

    Although GnuPG is being developed for several operating systems (often in parallel), the conventions used in this FAQ reflect a UNIX shell environment. For Win32 users, references to a shell prompt (`$') should be interpreted as a command prompt (`>'), directory names separated by a forward slash (`/') may need to be converted to a back slash (`\'), and a tilde (`~') represents a user's "home" directory (reference question 4.18 for an example).

    Some command-lines presented in this FAQ are too long to properly display in some browsers for the web page version of this file, and have been split into two or more lines. For these commands please remember to enter the entire command-string on one line or the command will error, or at minimum not give the desired results.

    Please keep in mind that this FAQ contains information that may not apply to your particular version, as new features and bug fixes are added on a continuing basis (reference the NEWS file included with the source or package for noteworthy changes between versions). One item to note is that starting with GnuPG version 1.1.92 the file containing user options and settings has been renamed from "options" to "gpg.conf". Information in the FAQ that relates to the options file may be interchangable with the newer gpg.conf file in many instances. See question 5.8 for details.

    2. SOURCES of INFORMATION

    2.1) Where can I find more information on GnuPG?

    On-line resources:

    • The documentation page is located at <http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/>. Also, have a look at the HOWTOs and the GNU Privacy Handbook (GPH, available in English, Spanish and Russian). The latter provides a detailed user's guide to GnuPG. You'll also find a document about how to convert from PGP 2.x to GnuPG.

    • At <http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html> you'll find an online archive of the GnuPG mailing lists. Most interesting should be gnupg-users for all user-related issues and gnupg-devel if you want to get in touch with the developers.

      In addition, searchable archives can be found on MARC, e.g.:
      gnupg-users: <http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=gnupg-users&r=1&w=2>
      gnupg-devel: <http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=gnupg-devel&r=1&w=2>

      PLEASE: Before posting to a list, read this FAQ and the available documentation. In addition, search the list archive - maybe your question has already been discussed. This way you help people focus on topics that have not yet been resolved.

    • The GnuPG source distribution contains a subdirectory:

      ./doc

      where some additional documentation is located (mainly interesting for hackers, not the casual user).

    2.2) Where do I get GnuPG?

    You can download the GNU Privacy Guard from its primary FTP server <ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/> or from one of the mirrors:

    <http://www.gnupg.org/download/mirrors.html>

    The current stable version is 1.2.2. Please upgrade to this version as it includes additional features, functions and security fixes that may not have existed in prior versions.

    3. INSTALLATION

    3.1) Which OSes does GnuPG run on?

    It should run on most Unices as well as Windows versions (including Windows NT/2000) and Macintosh OS/X. A list of OSes reported to be OK is presented at:

    <http://www.gnupg.org/download/supported_systems.html>

    3.2) Which random data gatherer should I use?

    "Good" random numbers are crucial for the security of your encryption. Different operating systems provide a variety of more or less quality random data. Linux and *BSD provide kernel generated random data through /dev/random - this should be the preferred choice on these systems. Also Solaris users with the SUNWski package installed have a /dev/random. In these cases, use the configure option:

    --enable-static-rnd=linux

    In addition, there's also the kernel random device by Andi Maier <http://www.cosy.sbg.ac.at/~andi/SUNrand/>, but it's still beta. Use at your own risk!

    On other systems, the Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is a good choice. It is a perl-daemon that monitors system activity and hashes it into random data. See the download page <http://www.gnupg.org/download/> to obtain EGD. Use:

    --enable-static-rnd=egd

    here.

    If the above options do not work, you can use the random number generator "unix". This is very slow and should be avoided. The random quality isn't very good so don't use it on sensitive data.

    3.3) How do I include support for RSA and IDEA?

    RSA is included as of GnuPG version 1.0.3.

    The official GnuPG distribution does not contain IDEA due to a patent restriction. The patent does not expire before 2007 so don't expect official support before then.

    However, there is an unofficial module to include it even in earlier versions of GnuPG. It's available from <ftp://ftp.gnupg.dk/pub/contrib-dk/>. Look for:

       idea.c.gz        (c module)
       idea.c.gz.sig    (signature file)
    

       ideadll.zip      (c module and win32 dll)
       ideadll.zip.sig  (signature file)
    

    Compilation directives are in the headers of these files. You will then need to add the following line to your ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf or ~/.gnupg/options file:

    load-extension idea

    4. USAGE

    4.1) What is the recommended key size?

    1024 bit for DSA signatures; even for plain Elgamal signatures. This is sufficient as the size of the hash is probably the weakest link if the key size is larger than 1024 bits. Encryption keys may have greater sizes, but you should then check the fingerprint of this key:

    $ gpg --fingerprint <user ID>

    As for the key algorithms, you should stick with the default (i.e., DSA signature and Elgamal encryption). An Elgamal signing key has the following disadvantages: the signature is larger, it is hard to create such a key useful for signatures which can withstand some real world attacks, you don't get any extra security compared to DSA, and there might be compatibility problems with certain PGP versions. It has only been introduced because at the time it was not clear whether there was a patent on DSA.

    4.2) Why does it sometimes take so long to create keys?

    The problem here is that we need a lot of random bytes and for that we (on Linux the /dev/random device) must collect some random data. It is really not easy to fill the Linux internal entropy buffer; I talked to Ted Ts'o and he commented that the best way to fill the buffer is to play with your keyboard. Good security has its price. What I do is to hit several times on the shift, control, alternate, and caps lock keys, because these keys do not produce output to the screen. This way you get your keys really fast (it's the same thing PGP2 does).

    Another problem might be another program which eats up your random bytes (a program (look at your daemons) that reads from /dev/random).

    4.3) And it really takes long when I work on a remote system. Why?

    Don't do this at all! You should never create keys or even use GnuPG on a remote system because you normally have no physical control over your secret key ring (which is in most cases vulnerable to advanced dictionary attacks) - I strongly encourage everyone to only create keys on a local computer (a disconnected laptop is probably the best choice) and if you need it on your connected box (I know, we all do this) be sure to have a strong password for both your account and for your secret key, and that you can trust your system administrator.

    When I check GnuPG on a remote system via ssh (I have no Alpha here) ;-) I have the same problem. It takes a *very* long time to create the keys, so I use a special option, --quick-random, to generate insecure keys which are only good for some tests.

    4.4) What is the difference between options and commands?

    If you do a 'gpg --help', you will get two separate lists. The first is a list of commands. The second is a list of options. Whenever you run GPG, you must pick exactly one command (with one exception, see below). You may pick one or more options. The command should, just by convention, come at the end of the argument list, after all the options. If the command takes a file (all the basic ones do), the filename comes at the very end. So the basic way to run gpg is:

    $ gpg [--option something] [--option2] [--option3 something] --command file

    Some options take arguments. For example, the --output option (which can be abbreviated as -o) is an option that takes a filename. The option's argument must follow immediately after the option itself, otherwise gpg doesn't know which option the argument is supposed to paired with. As an option, --output and its filename must come before the command. The --recipient (-r) option takes a name or keyID to encrypt the message to, which must come right after the -r option. The --encrypt (or -e) command comes after all the options and is followed by the file you wish to encrypt. Therefore in this example the command-line issued would be:

    $ gpg -r alice -o secret.txt -e test.txt

    If you write the options out in full, it is easier to read:

    $ gpg --recipient alice --output secret.txt --encrypt test.txt

    If you're encrypting to a file with the extension ".txt", then you'd probably expect to see ASCII-armored text in the file (not binary), so you need to add the --armor (-a) option, which doesn't take any arguments:

    $ gpg --armor --recipient alice --output secret.txt --encrypt test.txt

    If you imagine square brackets around the optional parts, it becomes a bit clearer:

    $ gpg [--armor] [--recipient alice] [--output secret.txt] --encrypt test.txt

    The optional parts can be rearranged any way you want:

    $ gpg --output secret.txt --recipient alice --armor --encrypt test.txt

    If your filename begins with a hyphen (e.g. "-a.txt"), GnuPG assumes this is an option and may complain. To avoid this you have to either use "./-a.txt", or stop the option and command processing with two hyphens: "-- -a.txt".

    The exception to using only one command: signing and encrypting at the same time. For this you can combine both commands, such as in:

    $ gpg [--options] --sign --encrypt foo.txt

    4.5) I can't delete a user ID on my secret keyring because it has already been deleted on my public keyring. What can I do?

    Because you can only select from the public key ring, there is no direct way to do this. However it is not very complicated to do anyway. Create a new user ID with exactly the same name and you will see that there are now two identical user IDs on the secret ring. Now select this user ID and delete it. Both user IDs will be removed from the secret ring.

    4.6) I can't delete my secret key because the public key disappeared. What can I do?

    To select a key a search is always done on the public keyring, therefore it is not possible to select a secret key without having the public key. Normally it should never happen that the public key got lost but the secret key is still available. The reality is different, so GnuPG implements a special way to deal with it: Simply use the long keyID to specify the key to delete, which can be obtained by using the --with-colons options (it is the fifth field in the lines beginning with "sec").

    If you've lost your public key and need to recreate it instead for continued use with your secret key, you may be able to use gpgsplit as detailed in question 4.21.

    4.7) What are trust, validity and ownertrust?

    With GnuPG, the term "ownertrust" is used instead of "trust" to help clarify that this is the value you have assigned to a key to express how much you trust the owner of this key to correctly sign (and thereby introduce) other keys. The "validity", or calculated trust, is a value which indicates how much GnuPG considers a key as being valid (that it really belongs to the one who claims to be the owner of the key). For more information on trust values see the chapter "The Web of Trust" in The GNU Privacy Handbook.

    4.8) How do I sign a patch file?

    Use "gpg --clearsign --not-dash-escaped ...". The problem with --clearsign is that all lines starting with a dash are quoted with "- "; obviously diff produces many lines starting with a dash and these are then quoted and that is not good for a patch ;-). To use a patch file without removing the cleartext signature, the special option --not-dash-escaped may be used to suppress generation of these escape sequences. You should not mail such a patch because spaces and line endings are also subject to the signature and a mailer may not preserve these. If you want to mail a file you can simply sign it using your MUA (Mail User Agent).

    4.9) Where is the "encrypt-to-self" option?

    Use "--encrypt-to your_keyID". You can use more than one of these options. To temporarily override the use of this additional key, you can use the option "--no-encrypt-to".

    4.10) How can I get rid of the Version and Comment headers in armored messages?

    Use "--no-version --comment ''". Note that the left over blank line is required by the protocol.

    4.11) What does the "You are using the xxxx character set." mean?

    This note is printed when UTF-8 mapping has to be done. Make sure that the displayed character set is the one you have activated on your system. Since "iso-8859-1" is the character set most used, this is the default. You can change the charset with the option "--charset". It is important that your active character set matches the one displayed - if not, restrict yourself to plain 7 bit ASCII and no mapping has to be done.

    4.12) How can I get list of key IDs used to encrypt a message?

    $ gpg --batch --decrypt --list-only --status-fd 1 2>/dev/null | awk '/^\[GNUPG:\] ENC_TO / { print $3 }'

    4.13) Why can't I decrypt files encrypted as symmetrical-only (-c) with a version of GnuPG prior to 1.0.1.

    There was a bug in GnuPG versions prior to 1.0.1 which affected files only if 3DES or Twofish was used for symmetric-only encryption (this has never been the default). The bug has been fixed, but to enable decryption of old files you should run gpg with the option "--emulate-3des-s2k-bug", decrypt the file and encrypt it again without this option.

    NOTE: This option was removed in GnuPG development version 1.1.0 and later updates, so you will need to use a version between 1.0.1 and 1.0.7 to re-encrypt any affected files.

    4.14) How can I use GnuPG in an automated environment?

    You should use the option --batch and don't use passphrases as there is usually no way to store it more securely than on the secret keyring itself. The suggested way to create keys for an automated environment is:

    On a secure machine:

    1. If you want to do automatic signing, create a signing subkey for your key (use the interactive key editing menu by issueing the command 'gpg --edit-key keyID', enter "addkey" and select the DSA key type).
    2. Make sure that you use a passphrase (needed by the current implementation).
    3. gpg --export-secret-subkeys --no-comment foo >secring.auto
    4. Copy secring.auto and the public keyring to a test directory.
    5. Change to this directory.
    6. gpg --homedir . --edit foo and use "passwd" to remove the passphrase from the subkeys. You may also want to remove all unused subkeys.
    7. Copy secring.auto to a floppy and carry it to the target box.

    On the target machine:

    1. Install secring.auto as the secret keyring.
    2. Now you can start your new service. It's also a good idea to install an intrusion detection system so that you hopefully get a notice of an successful intrusion, so that you in turn can revoke all the subkeys installed on that machine and install new subkeys.

    4.15) Which email-client can I use with GnuPG?

    Using GnuPG to encrypt email is one of the most popular uses. Several mail clients or mail user agents (MUAs) support GnuPG to varying degrees. Simplifying a bit, there are two ways mail can be encrypted with GnuPG: the "old style" ASCII armor (i.e. cleartext encryption), and RFC 2015 style (previously PGP/MIME, now OpenPGP). The latter has full MIME support. Some MUAs support only one of them, so whichever you actually use depends on your needs as well as the capabilities of your addressee. As well, support may be native to the MUA, or provided via "plug-ins" or external tools.

    The following list is not exhaustive:

       MUA            OpenPGP ASCII   How? (N,P,T)
       -------------------------------------------------------------
       Calypso           N      Y      P (Unixmail)
       Elm               N      Y      T (mailpgp,morepgp)
       Elm ME+           N      Y      N
       Emacs/Gnus        Y      Y      T (Mailcrypt,gpg.el)
       Emacs/Mew         Y      Y      N
       Emacs/VM          N      Y      T (Mailcrypt)
       Evolution         Y      Y      N
       Exmh              Y      Y      N
       GNUMail.app       Y      Y      P (PGPBundle)
       GPGMail           Y      Y      N
       KMail (<=1.4.x)   N      Y      N
       KMail (1.5.x)     Y(P)   Y(N)   P/N
       Mozilla           Y      Y      P (Enigmail)
       Mulberry          Y      Y      P
       Mutt              Y      Y      N
       Sylpheed          Y      Y      N
       Claws-mail        Y      Y      N
       TkRat             Y      Y      N
       XEmacs/Gnus       Y      Y      T (Mailcrypt)
       XEmacs/Mew        Y      Y      N
       XEmacs/VM         N      Y      T (Mailcrypt)
       XFmail            Y      Y      N
    
       N - Native, P - Plug-in, T - External Tool
    

    The following table lists proprietary MUAs. The GNU Project suggests against the use of these programs, but they are listed for interoperability reasons for your convenience.

       MUA            OpenPGP ASCII   How? (N,P,T)
       -------------------------------------------------------------
       Apple Mail        Y      Y      P (GPGMail)
       Becky2            Y      Y      P (BkGnuPG)
       Eudora            Y      Y      P (EuroraGPG)
       Eudora Pro        Y      Y      P (EudoraGPG)
       Lotus Notes       N      Y      P
       Netscape 4.x      N      Y      P
       Netscape 7.x      Y      Y      P (Enigmail)
       Novell Groupwise  N      Y      P
       Outlook           N      Y      P (G-Data)
       Outlook Express   N      Y      P (GPGOE)
       Pegasus           N      Y      P (QDPGP,PM-PGP)
       Pine              N      Y      T (pgpenvelope,(gpg|pgp)4pine)
       Postme            N      Y      P (GPGPPL)
       The Bat!          N      Y      P (Ritlabs)
    

    Good overviews of OpenPGP-support can be found at:
    <http://www.openpgp.fr.st/courrier_en.html> and
    <http://www.bretschneidernet.de/tips/secmua.html>.

    Users of Win32 MUAs that lack OpenPGP support may look into using GPGrelay <http://gpgrelay.sourceforge.net>, a small email-relaying server that uses GnuPG to enable many email clients to send and receive emails that conform to PGP-MIME (RFC 2015).

    4.16) Can't we have a gpg library?

    This has been frequently requested. However, the current viewpoint of the GnuPG maintainers is that this would lead to several security issues and will therefore not be implemented in the foreseeable future. However, for some areas of application gpgme could do the trick. You'll find it at <ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/gpgme>.

    4.17) I have successfully generated a revocation certificate, but I don't understand how to send it to the key servers.

    Most keyservers don't accept a 'bare' revocation certificate. You have to import the certificate into gpg first:

    $ gpg --import my-revocation.asc

    then send the revoked key to the keyservers:

    $ gpg --keyserver certserver.pgp.com --send-keys mykeyid

    (or use a keyserver web interface for this).

    4.18) How do I put my keyring in a different directory?

    GnuPG keeps several files in a special homedir directory. These include the options file, pubring.gpg, secring.gpg, trustdb.gpg, and others. GnuPG will always create and use these files. On unices, the homedir is usually ~/.gnupg; on Windows it is name "gnupg" and found below the user's application directory. Run the gpg and pass the option --version to see the name of that directory.

    If you want to put your keyrings somewhere else, use the option:

    --homedir /my/path/

    to make GnuPG create all its files in that directory. Your keyring will be "/my/path/pubring.gpg". This way you can store your secrets on a floppy disk. Don't use "--keyring" as its purpose is to specify additional keyring files.

    4.19) How do I verify signed packages?

    Before you can verify the signature that accompanies a package, you must first have the vendor, organisation, or issueing person's key imported into your public keyring. To prevent GnuPG warning messages the key should also be validated (or locally signed).

    You will also need to download the detached signature file along with the package. These files will usually have the same name as the package, with either a binary (.sig) or ASCII armor (.asc) extension.

    Once their key has been imported, and the package and accompanying signature files have been downloaded, use:

    $ gpg --verify sigfile signed-file

    If the signature file has the same base name as the package file, the package can also be verified by specifying just the signature file, as GnuPG will derive the package's file name from the name given (less the .sig or .asc extension). For example, to verify a package named foobar.tar.gz against its detached binary signature file, use:

    $ gpg --verify foobar.tar.gz.sig

    4.20) How do I export a keyring with only selected signatures (keys)?

    If you're wanting to create a keyring with only a subset of keys selected from a master keyring (for a club, user group, or company department for example), simply specify the keys you want to export:

    $ gpg --armor --export key1 key2 key3 key4 > keys1-4.asc

    4.21) I still have my secret key, but lost my public key. What can I do?

    All OpenPGP secret keys have a copy of the public key inside them, and in a worst-case scenario, you can create yourself a new public key using the secret key.

    A tool to convert a secret key into a public one has been included (it's actually a new option for gpgsplit) and is available with GnuPG versions 1.2.1 or later (or can be found in CVS). It works like this:

    $ gpgsplit --no-split --secret-to-public secret.gpg >publickey.gpg

    One should first try to export the secret key and convert just this one. Using the entire secret keyring should work too. After this has been done, the publickey.gpg file can be imported into GnuPG as usual.

    4.22) Clearsigned messages sent from my web-mail account have an invalid signature. Why?

    Check to make sure the settings for your web-based email account do not use HTML formatting for the pasted clearsigned message. This can alter the message with embedded HTML markup tags or spaces, resulting in an invalid signature. The recipient may be able to copy the signed message block to a text file for verification, or the web email service may allow you to attach the clearsigned message as a file if plaintext messages are not an option.

    5. COMPATIBILITY ISSUES

    5.1) How can I encrypt a message with GnuPG so that PGP is able to decrypt it?

    It depends on the PGP version.

    • PGP 2.x
      You can't do that because PGP 2.x normally uses IDEA which is not supported by GnuPG as it is patented (see 3.3), but if you have a modified version of PGP you can try this:

      $ gpg --rfc1991 --cipher-algo 3des ...

      Please don't pipe the data to encrypt to gpg but provide it using a filename; otherwise, PGP 2 will not be able to handle it.

      As for conventional encryption, you can't do this for PGP 2.

    • PGP 5.x and higher
      You need to provide two additional options:

      --compress-algo 1 --cipher-algo cast5

      You may also use "3des" instead of "cast5", and "blowfish" does not work with all versions of PGP 5. You may also want to put:

      compress-algo 1

      into your ~/.gnupg/options file - this does not affect normal GnuPG operation.

      This applies to conventional encryption as well.

    5.2) How do I migrate from PGP 2.x to GnuPG?

    PGP 2 uses the RSA and IDEA encryption algorithms. Whereas the RSA patent has expired and RSA is included as of GnuPG 1.0.3, the IDEA algorithm is still patented until 2007. Under certain conditions you may use IDEA even today. In that case, you may refer to Question 3.3 about how to add IDEA support to GnuPG and read <http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/pgp2x.html> to perform the migration.

    5.3) (removed)

    (empty)

    5.4) Why is PGP 5.x not able to encrypt messages with some keys?

    PGP, Inc. refuses to accept Elgamal keys of type 20 even for encryption. They only support type 16 (which is identical at least for decryption). To be more inter-operable, GnuPG (starting with version 0.3.3) now also uses type 16 for the Elgamal subkey which is created if the default key algorithm is chosen. You may add a type 16 Elgamal key to your public key, which is easy as your key signatures are still valid.

    5.5) Why is PGP 5.x not able to verify my messages?

    PGP 5.x does not accept v4 signatures for data material but OpenPGP requests generation of v4 signatures for all kind of data, that's why GnuPG defaults to them. Use the option "--force-v3-sigs" to generate v3 signatures for data.

    5.6) How do I transfer owner trust values from PGP to GnuPG?

    There is a script in the tools directory to help you. After you have imported the PGP keyring you can give this command:

    $ lspgpot pgpkeyring | gpg --import-ownertrust

    where pgpkeyring is the original keyring and not the GnuPG keyring you might have created in the first step.

    5.7) PGP does not like my secret key.

    Older PGPs probably bail out on some private comment packets used by GnuPG. These packets are fully in compliance with OpenPGP; however PGP is not really OpenPGP aware. A workaround is to export the secret keys with this command:

    $ gpg --export-secret-keys --no-comment -a your-KeyID

    Another possibility is this: by default, GnuPG encrypts your secret key using the Blowfish symmetric algorithm. Older PGPs will only understand 3DES, CAST5, or IDEA symmetric algorithms. Using the following method you can re-encrypt your secret gpg key with a different algo:

    $ gpg --s2k-cipher-algo=CAST5 --s2k-digest-algo=SHA1 --compress-algo=1 --edit-key <username>

    Then use passwd to change the password (just change it to the same thing, but it will encrypt the key with CAST5 this time).

    Now you can export it and PGP should be able to handle it.

    For PGP 6.x the following options work to export a key:

    $ gpg --s2k-cipher-algo 3des --compress-algo 1 --rfc1991 --export-secret-keys <KeyID>

    5.8) GnuPG no longer installs a ~/.gnupg/options file. Is it missing?

    No. The ~/.gnupg/options file has been renamed to ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf for new installs as of version 1.1.92. If an existing ~/.gnupg/options file is found during an upgrade it will still be used, but this change was required to have a more consistent naming scheme with forthcoming tools. An existing options file can be renamed to gpg.conf for users upgrading, or receiving the message that the "old default options file" is ignored (occurs if both a gpg.conf and an options file are found).

    5.9) How do you export GnuPG keys for use with PGP?

    This has come up fairly often, so here's the HOWTO:

    PGP can (for most key types) use secret keys generated by GnuPG. The problems that come up occasionally are generally because GnuPG supports a few more features from the OpenPGP standard than PGP does. If your secret key has any of those features in use, then PGP will reject the key or you will have problems communicating later. Note that PGP doesn't do Elgamal signing keys at all, so they are not usable with any version.

    These instructions should work for GnuPG 1.0.7 and later, and PGP 7.0.3 and later.

    Start by editing the key. Most of this line is not really necessary as the default values are correct, but it does not hurt to repeat the values, as this will override them in case you have something else set in your options file.

    $ gpg --s2k-cipher-algo cast5 --s2k-digest-algo sha1 --s2k-mode 3 --simple-sk-checksum --edit KeyID

    Turn off some features. Set the list of preferred ciphers, hashes, and compression algorithms to things that PGP can handle. (Yes, I know this is an odd list of ciphers, but this is what PGP itself uses, minus IDEA).

    > setpref S9 S8 S7 S3 S2 S10 H2 H3 Z1 Z0

    Now put the list of preferences onto the key.

    > updpref

    Finally we must decrypt and re-encrypt the key, making sure that we encrypt with a cipher that PGP likes. We set this up in the --edit line above, so now we just need to change the passphrase to make it take effect. You can use the same passphrase if you like, or take this opportunity to actually change it.

    > passwd

    Save our work.

    > save

    Now we can do the usual export:

    $ gpg --export KeyID > mypublickey.pgp
    $ gpg --export-secret-key KeyID > mysecretkey.pgp

    Thanks to David Shaw for this information!

    6. PROBLEMS and ERROR MESSAGES

    6.1) Why do I get "gpg: Warning: using insecure memory!"

    On many systems this program should be installed as setuid(root). This is necessary to lock memory pages. Locking memory pages prevents the operating system from writing them to disk and thereby keeping your secret keys really secret. If you get no warning message about insecure memory your operating system supports locking without being root. The program drops root privileges as soon as locked memory is allocated.

    To setuid(root) permissions on the gpg binary you can either use:

    $ chmod u+s /path/to/gpg

    or

    $ chmod 4755 /path/to/gpg

    Some refrain from using setuid(root) unless absolutely required for security reasons. Please check with your system administrator if you are not able to make these determinations yourself.

    On UnixWare 2.x and 7.x you should install GnuPG with the 'plock' privilege to get the same effect:

    $ filepriv -f plock /path/to/gpg

    If you can't or don't want to install GnuPG setuid(root), you can use the option "--no-secmem-warning" or put:

    no-secmem-warning

    in your ~/.gnupg/options or ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf file (this disables the warning).

    On some systems (e.g., Windows) GnuPG does not lock memory pages and older GnuPG versions (<=1.0.4) issue the warning:

    gpg: Please note that you don't have secure memory

    This warning can't be switched off by the above option because it was thought to be too serious an issue. However, it confused users too much, so the warning was eventually removed.

    6.2) Large File Support doesn't work ...

    LFS works correctly in post-1.0.4 versions. If configure doesn't detect it, try a different (i.e., better) compiler. egcs 1.1.2 works fine, other gccs sometimes don't. BTW, several compilation problems of GnuPG 1.0.3 and 1.0.4 on HP-UX and Solaris were due to broken LFS support.

    6.3) In the edit menu the trust values are not displayed correctly after signing uids. Why?

    This happens because some information is stored immediately in the trustdb, but the actual trust calculation can be done after the save command. This is a "not easy to fix" design bug which will be addressed in some future release.

    6.4) What does "skipping pubkey 1: already loaded" mean?

    As of GnuPG 1.0.3, the RSA algorithm is included. If you still have a "load-extension rsa" in your options file, the above message occurs. Just remove the load command from the options file.

    6.5) GnuPG 1.0.4 doesn't create ~/.gnupg ...

    That's a known bug, already fixed in newer versions.

    6.6) An Elgamal signature does not verify anymore since version 1.0.2 ...

    Use the option --emulate-md-encode-bug.

    6.7) Old versions of GnuPG can't verify Elgamal signatures

    Update to GnuPG 1.0.2 or newer.

    6.8) When I use --clearsign, the plain text has sometimes extra dashes in it - why?

    This is called dash-escaped text and is required by OpenPGP. It always happens when a line starts with a dash ("-") and is needed to make the lines that structure signature and text (i.e., "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----") to be the only lines that start with two dashes.

    If you use GnuPG to process those messages, the extra dashes are removed. Good mail clients remove those extra dashes when displaying such a message.

    6.9) What is the thing with "can't handle multiple signatures"?

    Due to different message formats GnuPG is not always able to split a file with multiple signatures unambiguously into its parts. This error message informs you that there is something wrong with the input.

    The only way to have multiple signatures in a file is by using the OpenPGP format with one-pass-signature packets (which is GnuPG's default) or the cleartext signed format.

    6.10) If I submit a key to a keyserver, nothing happens ...

    You are most likely using GnuPG 1.0.2 or older on Windows. That's feature isn't yet implemented, but it's a bug not to say it. Newer versions issue a warning. Upgrade to 1.4.5 or newer.

    6.11) I get "gpg: waiting for lock ..."

    A previous instance of gpg has most likely exited abnormally and left a lock file. Go to ~/.gnupg and look for .*.lock files and remove them.

    6.12) Older gpg binaries (e.g., 1.0) have problems with keys from newer gpg binaries ...

    As of 1.0.3, keys generated with gpg are created with preferences to TWOFISH (and AES since 1.0.4) and that also means that they have the capability to use the new MDC encryption method. This will go into OpenPGP soon, and is also suppoted by PGP 7. This new method avoids a (not so new) attack on all email encryption systems.

    This in turn means that pre-1.0.3 gpg binaries have problems with newer keys. Because of security and bug fixes, you should keep your GnuPG installation in a recent state anyway. As a workaround, you can force gpg to use a previous default cipher algo by putting:

    cipher-algo cast5

    into your options file.

    6.13) With 1.0.4, I get "this cipher algorithm is deprecated ..."

    If you just generated a new key and get this message while encrypting, you've witnessed a bug in 1.0.4. It uses the new AES cipher Rijndael that is incorrectly being referred as "deprecated". Ignore this warning, more recent versions of gpg are corrected.

    6.14) Some dates are displayed as ????-??-??. Why?

    Due to constraints in most libc implementations, dates beyond 2038-01-19 can't be displayed correctly. 64-bit OSes are not affected by this problem. To avoid printing wrong dates, GnuPG instead prints some question marks. To see the correct value, you can use the options --with-colons and --fixed-list-mode.

    6.15) I still have a problem. How do I report a bug?

    Are you sure that it's not been mentioned somewhere on the mailing lists? Did you have a look at the bug list (you'll find a link to the list of reported bugs on the documentation page). If you're not sure about it being a bug, you can send mail to the gnupg-devel list. Otherwise, use the bug tracking system <http://bugs.gnupg.org>.

    6.16) Why doesn't GnuPG support X.509 certificates?

    GnuPG, first and foremost, is an implementation of the OpenPGP standard (RFC 2440), which is a competing infrastructure, different from X.509.

    They are both public-key cryptosystems, but how the public keys are actually handled is different.

    6.17) Why do national characters in my user ID look funny?

    According to OpenPGP, GnuPG encodes user ID strings (and other things) using UTF-8. In this encoding of Unicode, most national characters get encoded as two- or three-byte sequences. For example, &aring; (0xE5 in ISO-8859-1) becomes &Atilde;&yen; (0xC3, 0xA5). This might also be the reason why keyservers can't find your key.

    6.18) I get 'sed' errors when running ./configure on Mac OS X ...

    This will be fixed after GnuPG has been upgraded to autoconf-2.50. Until then, find the line setting CDPATH in the configure script and place an:

    unset CDPATH

    statement below it.

    6.19) Why does GnuPG 1.0.6 bail out on keyrings used with 1.0.7?

    There is a small bug in 1.0.6 which didn't parse trust packets correctly. You may want to apply this patch if you can't upgrade:

    <http://www.gnupg.org/developer/gpg-woody-fix.txt>

    6.20) I upgraded to GnuPG version 1.0.7 and now it takes longer to load my keyrings. What can I do?

    The way signature states are stored has changed so that v3 signatures can be supported. You can use the new --rebuild-keydb-caches migration command, which was built into this release and increases the speed of many operations for existing keyrings.

    6.21) Doesn't a fully trusted user ID on a key prevent warning messages when encrypting to other IDs on the key?

    No. That was actually a key validity bug in GnuPG 1.2.1 and earlier versions. As part of the development of GnuPG 1.2.2, a bug was discovered in the key validation code. This bug causes keys with more than one user ID to give all user IDs on the key the amount of validity given to the most-valid key. The bug has been fixed in GnuPG release 1.2.2, and upgrading is the recommended fix for this problem. More information and a patch for a some pre-1.2.2 versions of GnuPG can be found at:

    <http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2003q2/000268.html>

    6.22) I just compiled GnuPG from source on my GNU/Linux RPM-based system and it's not working. Why?

    Many GNU/Linux distributions that are RPM-based will install a version of GnuPG as part of its standard installation, placing the binaries in the /usr/bin directory. Later, compiling and installing GnuPG from source other than from a source RPM won't normally overwrite these files, as the default location for placement of GnuPG binaries is in /usr/local/bin unless the '--prefix' switch is used during compile to specify an alternate location. Since the /usr/bin directory more than likely appears in your path before /usr/local/bin, the older RPM-version binaries will continue to be used when called since they were not replaced.

    To resolve this, uninstall the RPM-based version with 'rpm -e gnupg' before installing the binaries compiled from source. If dependency errors are displayed when attempting to uninstall the RPM (such as when Red Hat's up2date is also installed, which uses GnuPG), uninstall the RPM with 'rpm -e gnupg --nodeps' to force the uninstall. Any dependent files should be automatically replaced during the install of the compiled version. If the default /usr/local/bin directory is used, some packages such as SuSE's Yast Online Update may need to be configured to look for GnuPG binaries in the /usr/local/bin directory, or symlinks can be created in /usr/bin that point to the binaries located in /usr/local/bin.

    7. ADVANCED TOPICS

    7.1) How does this whole thing work?

    To generate a secret/public keypair, run:

    $ gpg --gen-key

    and choose the default values.

    Data that is encrypted with a public key can only be decrypted by the matching secret key. The secret key is protected by a password, the public key is not.

    So to send your friend a message, you would encrypt your message with his public key, and he would only be able to decrypt it by having the secret key and putting in the password to use his secret key.

    GnuPG is also useful for signing things. Files that are encrypted with the secret key can be decrypted with the public key. To sign something, a hash is taken of the data, and then the hash is in some form encoded with the secret key. If someone has your public key, they can verify that it is from you and that it hasn't changed by checking the encoded form of the hash with the public key.

    A keyring is just a large file that stores keys. You have a public keyring where you store yours and your friend's public keys. You have a secret keyring that you keep your secret key on, and should be very careful with. Never ever give anyone else access to it and use a *good* passphrase to protect the data in it.

    You can 'conventionally' encrypt something by using the option 'gpg -c'. It is encrypted using a passphrase, and does not use public and secret keys. If the person you send the data to knows that passphrase, they can decrypt it. This is usually most useful for encrypting things to yourself, although you can encrypt things to your own public key in the same way. It should be used for communication with partners you know and where it is easy to exchange the passphrases (e.g. with your boy friend or your wife). The advantage is that you can change the passphrase from time to time and decrease the risk, that many old messages may be decrypted by people who accidently got your passphrase.

    You can add and copy keys to and from your keyring with the 'gpg --import' and 'gpg --export' command. 'gpg --export-secret-keys' will export secret keys. This is normally not useful, but you can generate the key on one machine then move it to another machine.

    Keys can be signed under the 'gpg --edit-key' option. When you sign a key, you are saying that you are certain that the key belongs to the person it says it comes from. You should be very sure that is really that person: You should verify the key fingerprint with:

    $ gpg --fingerprint KeyID

    over the phone (if you really know the voice of the other person), at a key signing party (which are often held at computer conferences), or at a meeting of your local GNU/Linux User Group.

    Hmm, what else. You may use the option '-o filename' to force output to this filename (use '-' to force output to stdout). '-r' just lets you specify the recipient (which public key you encrypt with) on the command line instead of typing it interactively.

    Oh yeah, this is important. By default all data is encrypted in some weird binary format. If you want to have things appear in ASCII text that is readable, just add the '-a' option. But the preferred method is to use a MIME aware mail reader (Mutt, Pine and many more).

    There is a small security glitch in the OpenPGP (and therefore GnuPG) system; to avoid this you should always sign and encrypt a message instead of only encrypting it.

    7.2) Why are some signatures with an ELG-E key valid?

    These are Elgamal keys generated by GnuPG in v3 (RFC 1991) packets. The OpenPGP draft later changed the algorithm identifier for Elgamal keys which are usable for signatures and encryption from 16 to 20. GnuPG now uses 20 when it generates new Elgamal keys but still accepts 16 (which is according to OpenPGP "encryption only") if this key is in a v3 packet. GnuPG is the only program which had used these v3 Elgamal keys - so this assumption is quite safe.

    7.3) How does the whole trust thing work?

    It works more or less like PGP. The difference is that the trust is computed at the time it is needed. This is one of the reasons for the trustdb which holds a list of valid key signatures. If you are not running in batch mode you will be asked to assign a trust parameter (ownertrust) to a key.

    You can see the validity (calculated trust value) using this command.

    $ gpg --list-keys --with-colons

    If the first field is "pub" or "uid", the second field shows you the trust:

       o = Unknown (this key is new to the system)
       e = The key has expired
       q = Undefined (no value assigned)
       n = Don't trust this key at all
       m = There is marginal trust in this key
       f = The key is full trusted
       u = The key is ultimately trusted; this is only used
           for keys for which the secret key is also available.
       r = The key has been revoked
       d = The key has been disabled
    

    The value in the "pub" record is the best one of all "uid" records. You can get a list of the assigned trust values (how much you trust the owner to correctly sign another person's key) with:

    $ gpg --list-ownertrust

    The first field is the fingerprint of the primary key, the second field is the assigned value:

       - = No ownertrust value yet assigned or calculated.
       n = Never trust this keyholder to correctly verify others signatures.
       m = Have marginal trust in the keyholders capability to sign other
           keys.
       f = Assume that the key holder really knows how to sign keys.
       u = No need to trust ourself because we have the secret key.
    

    Keep these values confidential because they express your opinions about others. PGP stores this information with the keyring thus it is not a good idea to publish a PGP keyring instead of exporting the keyring. GnuPG stores the trust in the trustdb.gpg file so it is okay to give a gpg keyring away (but we have a --export command too).

    7.4) What kind of output is this: "key C26EE891.298, uid 09FB: ...."?

    This is the internal representation of a user ID in the trustdb. "C26EE891" is the keyid, "298" is the local ID (a record number in the trustdb) and "09FB" is the last two bytes of a ripe-md-160 hash of the user ID for this key.

    7.5) How do I interpret some of the informational outputs?

    While checking the validity of a key, GnuPG sometimes prints some information which is prefixed with information about the checked item.

    "key 12345678.3456"

    This is about the key with key ID 12345678 and the internal number 3456, which is the record number of the so called directory record in the trustdb.

    "uid 12345678.3456/ACDE"

    This is about the user ID for the same key. To identify the user ID the last two bytes of a ripe-md-160 over the user ID ring is printed.

    "sig 12345678.3456/ACDE/9A8B7C6D"

    This is about the signature with key ID 9A8B7C6D for the above key and user ID, if it is a signature which is direct on a key, the user ID part is empty (..//..).

    7.6) Are the header lines of a cleartext signature part of the signed material?

    No. For example you can add or remove "Comment:" lines. They have a purpose like the mail header lines. However a "Hash:" line is needed for OpenPGP signatures to tell the parser which hash algorithm to use.

    7.7) What is the list of preferred algorithms?

    The list of preferred algorithms is a list of cipher, hash and compression algorithms stored in the self-signature of a key during key generation. When you encrypt a document, GnuPG uses this list (which is then part of a public key) to determine which algorithms to use. Basically it tells other people what algorithms the recipient is able to handle and provides an order of preference.

    7.8) How do I change the list of preferred algorithms?

    In version 1.0.7 or later, you can use the edit menu and set the new list of preference using the command "setpref"; the format of this command resembles the output of the command "pref". The preference is not changed immediately but the set preference will be used when a new user ID is created. If you want to update the preferences for existing user IDs, select those user IDs (or select none to update all) and enter the command "updpref". Note that the timestamp of the self-signature is increased by one second when running this command.

    7.9) How can I import all the missing signer keys?

    If you imported a key and you want to also import all the signer's keys, you can do this with this command:

    gpg --check-sigs --with-colon KEYID \ | awk -F: '$1 == "sig" && $2 == "?" { print $5 }' \ | sort | uniq | xargs echo gpg --recv-keys

    Note that the invocation of sort is also required to wait for the of the listing before before starting the import.

    8. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

    Many thanks to Nils Ellmenreich for maintaining this FAQ file for such a long time, Werner Koch for the original FAQ file, and to all posters to gnupg-users and gnupg-devel. They all provided most of the answers.

    Also thanks to Casper Dik for providing us with a script to generate this FAQ (he uses it for the excellent Solaris2 FAQ).


    Copyright (C) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02111, USA

    Verbatim copying and distribution of this entire article is permitted in any medium, provided this notice is preserved. PK[ibU]U]NEWSnuW+ANoteworthy changes in version 2.0.14 (2009-12-21) ------------------------------------------------- * The default for --include-cert is now to include all certificates in the chain except for the root certificate. * Numerical values may now be used as an alternative to the debug-level keywords. * The GPGSM --audit-log feature is now more complete. * GPG now supports DNS lookups for SRV, PKA and CERT on W32. * New GPGSM option --ignore-cert-extension. * New and changed passphrases are now created with an iteration count requiring about 100ms of CPU work. Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.13 (2009-09-04) ------------------------------------------------- * GPG now generates 2048 bit RSA keys by default. The default hash algorithm preferences has changed to prefer SHA-256 over SHA-1. 2048 bit DSA keys are now generated to use a 256 bit hash algorithm * The envvars XMODIFIERS, GTK_IM_MODULE and QT_IM_MODULE are now passed to the Pinentry to make SCIM work. * The GPGSM command --gen-key features a --batch mode and implements all features of gpgsm-gencert.sh in standard mode. * New option --re-import for GPGSM's IMPORT server command. * Enhanced writing of existing keys to OpenPGP v2 cards. * Add hack to the internal CCID driver to allow the use of some Omnikey based card readers with 2048 bit keys. * GPG now repeatly asks the user to insert the requested OpenPGP card. This can be disabled with --limit-card-insert-tries=1. * Minor bug fixes. Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.12 (2009-06-17) ------------------------------------------------- * GPGSM now always lists ephemeral certificates if specified by fingerprint or keygrip. * New command "KEYINFO" for GPG_AGENT. GPGSM now also returns information about smartcards. * Made sure not to leak file descriptors if running gpg-agent with a command. Restore the signal mask to solve a problem in Mono. * Changed order of the confirmation questions for root certificates and store negative answers in trustlist.txt. * Better synchronization of concurrent smartcard sessions. * Support 2048 bit OpenPGP cards. * Support Telesec Netkey 3 cards. * The gpg-protect-tool now uses gpg-agent via libassuan. Under Windows the Pinentry will now be put into the foreground. * Changed code to avoid a possible Mac OS X system freeze. Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.11 (2009-03-03) ------------------------------------------------- * Fixed a problem in SCDAEMON which caused unexpected card resets. * SCDAEMON is now aware of the Geldkarte. * The SCDAEMON option --allow-admin is now used by default. * GPGCONF now restarts SCdaemon if necessary. * The default cipher algorithm in GPGSM is now again 3DES. This is due to interoperability problems with Outlook 2003 which still can't cope with AES. Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.10 (2009-01-12) ------------------------------------------------- * [gpg] New keyserver helper gpg2keys_kdns as generic DNS CERT lookup. Run with --help for a short description. Requires the ADNS library. * [gpg] New mechanisms "local" and "nodefault" for --auto-key-locate. Fixed a few problems with this option. * [gpg] New command --locate-keys. * [gpg] New options --with-sig-list and --with-sig-check. * [gpg] The option "-sat" is no longer an alias for --clearsign. * [gpg] The option --fixed-list-mode is now implicitly used and obsolete. * [gpg] New control statement %ask-passphrase for the unattended key generation. * [gpg] The algorithm to compute the SIG_ID status has been changed. * [gpgsm] Now uses AES by default. * [gpgsm] Made --output option work with --export-secret-key-p12. * [gpg-agent] Terminate process if the own listening socket is not anymore served by ourself. * [scdaemon] Made it more robust on W32. * [gpg-connect-agent] Accept commands given as command line arguments. * [w32] Initialized the socket subsystem for all keyserver helpers. * [w32] The sysconf directory has been moved from a subdirectory of the installation directory to %CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA%/GNU/etc/gnupg. * [w32] The gnupg2.nls directory is not anymore used. The standard locale directory is now used. * [w32] Fixed a race condition between gpg and gpgsm in the use of temporary file names. * The gpg-preset-passphrase mechanism works again. An arbitrary string may now be used for a custom cache ID. * Admin PINs are cached again (bug in 2.0.9). * Support for version 2 OpenPGP cards. * Libgcrypt 1.4 is now required. Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.9 (2008-03-26) ------------------------------------------------ * Gpgsm always tries to locate missing certificates from a running Dirmngr's cache. * Tweaks for Windows. * The Admin PIN for OpenPGP cards may now be entered with the pinpad. * Improved certificate chain construction. * Extended the PKITS framework. * Fixed a bug in the ambigious name detection. * Fixed possible memory corruption while importing OpenPGP keys (bug introduced with 2.0.8). [CVE-2008-1530] * Minor bug fixes. Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.8 (2007-12-20) ------------------------------------------------ * Enhanced gpg-connect-agent with a small scripting language. * New option --list-config for gpgconf. * Fixed a crash in gpgconf. * Gpg-agent now supports the passphrase quality bar of the latest Pinentry. * The envvars XAUTHORITY and PINENTRY_USER_DATA are now passed to the Pinentry. * Fixed the auto creation of the key stub for smartcards. * Fixed a rare bug in decryption using the OpenPGP card. * Creating DSA2 keys is now possible. * New option --extra-digest-algo for gpgsm to allow verification of broken signatures. * Allow encryption with legacy Elgamal sign+encrypt keys with option --rfc2440. * Windows is now a supported platform. * Made sure that under Windows the file permissions of the socket are taken into account. This required a change of our socket emulation code and changed the IPC protocol under Windows. Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.7 (2007-09-10) ------------------------------------------------ * Fixed encryption problem if duplicate certificates are in the keybox. * Made it work on Windows Vista. Note that the entire Windows port is still considered Beta. * Add new options min-passphrase-nonalpha, check-passphrase-pattern, enforce-passphrase-constraints and max-passphrase-days to gpg-agent. * Add command --check-components to gpgconf. Gpgconf now uses the installed versions of the programs and does not anymore search via PATH for them. Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.6 (2007-08-16) ------------------------------------------------ * GPGSM does now grok --default-key. * GPGCONF is now aware of --default-key and --encrypt-to. * GPGSM does again correctly print the serial number as well the the various keyids. This was broken since 2.0.4. * New option --validation-model and support for the chain-model. * Improved Windows support. Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.5 (2007-07-05) ------------------------------------------------ * Switched license to GPLv3. * Basic support for Windows. Run "./autogen.sh --build-w32" to build it. As usual the mingw cross compiling toolchain is required. * Fixed bug when using the --p12-charset without --armor. * The command --gen-key may now be used instead of the gpgsm-gencert.sh script. * Changed key generation to reveal less information about the machine. Bug fixes for gpg2's card key generation. Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.4 (2007-05-09) ------------------------------------------------ * The server mode key listing commands are now also working for systems without the funopen/fopencookie API. * PKCS#12 import now tries several encodings in case the passphrase was not utf-8 encoded. New option --p12-charset for gpgsm. * Improved the libgcrypt logging support in all modules. Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.3 (2007-03-08) ------------------------------------------------ * By default, do not allow processing multiple plaintexts in a single stream. Many programs that called GnuPG were assuming that GnuPG did not permit this, and were thus not using the plaintext boundary status tags that GnuPG provides. This change makes GnuPG reject such messages by default which makes those programs safe again. --allow-multiple-messages returns to the old behavior. [CVE-2007-1263]. * New --verify-option show-primary-uid-only. * gpgconf may now reads a global configuration file to select which options are changeable by a frontend. The new applygnupgdefaults tool may be used by an admin to set default options for all users. * The PIN pad of the Cherry XX44 keyboard is now supported. The DINSIG and the NKS applications are now also aware of PIN pads. Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.2 (2007-01-31) ------------------------------------------------ * Fixed a serious and exploitable bug in processing encrypted packages. [CVE-2006-6235]. * Added --passphrase-repeat to set the number of times GPG will prompt for a new passphrase to be repeated. This is useful to help memorize a new passphrase. The default is 1 repetition. * Using a PIN pad does now also work for the signing key. * A warning is displayed by gpg-agent if a new passphrase is too short. New option --min-passphrase-len defaults to 8. * The status code BEGIN_SIGNING now shows the used hash algorithms. Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.1 (2006-11-28) ------------------------------------------------ * Experimental support for the PIN pads of the SPR 532 and the Kaan Advanced card readers. Add "disable-keypad" scdaemon.conf if you don't want it. Does currently only work for the OpenPGP card and its authentication and decrypt keys. * Fixed build problems on some some platforms and crashes on amd64. * Fixed a buffer overflow in gpg2. [bug#728,CVE-2006-6169] Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.0 (2006-11-11) ------------------------------------------------ * First stable version of a GnuPG integrating OpenPGP and S/MIME. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.95 (2006-11-06) ------------------------------------------------- * Minor bug fixes. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.94 (2006-10-24) ------------------------------------------------- * Keys for gpgsm may now be specified using a keygrip. A keygrip is indicated by a prefixing it with an ampersand. * gpgconf now supports switching the CMS cipher algo (e.g. to AES). * New command --gpgconf-test for all major tools. This may be used to check whether the configuration file is sane. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.93 (2006-10-18) ------------------------------------------------- * In --with-validation mode gpgsm will now also ask whether a root certificate should be trusted. * Link to Pth only if really necessary. * Fixed a pubring corruption bug in gpg2 occurring when importing signatures or keys with insane lengths. * Fixed v3 keyID calculation bug in gpg2. * More tweaks for certificates without extensions. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.92 (2006-10-11) ------------------------------------------------- * Bug fixes. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.91 (2006-10-04) ------------------------------------------------- * New "relax" flag for trustlist.txt to allow root CA certificates without BasicContraints. * [gpg2] Removed the -k PGP 2 compatibility hack. -k is now an alias for --list-keys. * [gpg2] Print a warning if "-sat" is used instead of "--clearsign". Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.90 (2006-09-25) ------------------------------------------------- * Made readline work for gpg. * Cleanups und minor bug fixes. * Included translations from gnupg 1.4.5. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.23 (2006-09-18) ------------------------------------------------- * Regular man pages for most tools are now build directly from the Texinfo source. * The gpg code from 1.4.5 has been fully merged into this release. The configure option --enable-gpg is still required to build this gpg part. For production use of OpenPGP the gpg version 1.4.5 is still recommended. Note, that gpg will be installed under the name gpg2 to allow coexisting with an 1.4.x gpg. * API change in gpg-agent's pkdecrypt command. Thus an older gpgsm may not be used with the current gpg-agent. * The scdaemon will now call a script on reader status changes. * gpgsm now allows file descriptor passing for "INPUT", "OUTPUT" and "MESSAGE". * The gpgsm server may now output a key listing to the output file handle. This needs to be enabled using "OPTION list-to-output=1". * The --output option of gpgsm has now an effect on list-keys. * New gpgsm commands --dump-chain and list-chain. * gpg-connect-agent has new options to utilize descriptor passing. * A global trustlist may now be used. See doc/examples/trustlist.txt. * When creating a new pubring.kbx keybox common certificates are imported. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.22 (2006-07-27) ------------------------------------------------- * Enhanced pkcs#12 support to allow import from simple keyBags. * Exporting to pkcs#12 now create bag attributes so that Mozilla is able to import the files. * Fixed uploading of certain keys to the smart card. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.21 (2006-06-20) ------------------------------------------------- * New command APDU for scdaemon to allow using it for general card access. Might be used through gpg-connect-agent by using the SCD prefix command. * Support for the CardMan 4040 PCMCIA reader (Linux 2.6.15 required). * Scdaemon does not anymore reset cards at the end of a connection. * Kludge to allow use of Bundesnetzagentur issued X.509 certificates. * Added --hash=xxx option to scdaemon's PKSIGN command. * Pkcs#12 files are now created with a MAC. This is for better interoperability. * Collected bug fixes and minor other changes. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.20 (2005-12-20) ------------------------------------------------- * Importing pkcs#12 files created be recent versions of Mozilla works again. * Basic support for qualified signatures. * New debug tool gpgparsemail. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.19 (2005-09-12) ------------------------------------------------- * The Belgian eID card is now supported for signatures and ssh. Other pkcs#15 cards should work as well. * Fixed bug in --export-secret-key-p12 so that certificates are again included. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.18 (2005-08-01) ------------------------------------------------- * [gpgsm] Now allows for more than one email address as well as URIs and dnsNames in certificate request generation. A keygrip may be given to create a request from an existing key. * A couple of minor bug fixes. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.17 (2005-06-20) ------------------------------------------------- * gpg-connect-agent has now features to handle Assuan INQUIRE commands. * Internal changes for OpenPGP cards. New Assuan command WRITEKEY. * GNU Pth is now a hard requirement. * [scdaemon] Support for OpenSC has been removed. Instead a new and straightforward pkcs#15 modules has been written. As of now it does allows only signing using TCOS cards but we are going to enhance it to match all the old capabilities. * [gpg-agent] New option --write-env-file and Assuan command UPDATESTARTUPTTY. * [gpg-agent] New option --default-cache-ttl-ssh to set the TTL for SSH passphrase caching independent from the other passphrases. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.16 (2005-04-21) ------------------------------------------------- * gpg-agent does now support the ssh-agent protocol and thus allows to use the pinentry as well as the OpenPGP smartcard with ssh. * New tool gpg-connect-agent as a general client for the gpg-agent. * New tool symcryptrun as a wrapper for certain encryption tools. * The gpg tool is not anymore build by default because those gpg versions available in the gnupg 1.4 series are far more matured. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.15 (2005-01-13) ------------------------------------------------- * Fixed passphrase caching bug. * Better support for CCID readers; the reader from Cherry RS 6700 USB does now work. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.14 (2004-12-22) ------------------------------------------------- * [gpg-agent] New option --use-standard-socket to allow the use of a fixed socket. gpgsm falls back to this socket if GPG_AGENT_INFO has not been set. * Ported to MS Windows with some functional limitations. * New tool gpg-preset-passphrase. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.13 (2004-12-03) ------------------------------------------------- * [gpgsm] New option --prefer-system-dirmngr. * Minor cleanups and debugging aids. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.12 (2004-10-22) ------------------------------------------------- * [scdaemon] Partly rewrote the PC/SC code. * Removed the sc-investigate tool. It is now in a separate package available at ftp://ftp.g10code.com/g10code/gscutils/ . * [gpg-agent] Fixed logging problem. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.11 (2004-10-01) ------------------------------------------------- * When using --import along with --with-validation, the imported certificates are validated and only imported if they are fully valid. * [gpg-agent] New option --max-cache-ttl. * [gpg-agent] When used without --daemon or --server, gpg-agent now check whether a agent is already running and usable. * Fixed some i18n problems. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.10 (2004-07-22) ------------------------------------------------- * Fixed a serious bug in the checking of trusted root certificates. * New configure option --enable-agent-pnly allows to build and install just the agent. * Fixed a problem with the log file handling. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.9 (2004-06-08) ------------------------------------------------ * [gpg-agent] The new option --allow-mark-trusted is now required to allow gpg-agent to add a key to the trustlist.txt after user confirmation. * Creating PKCS#10 requests does now honor the key usage. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.8 (2004-04-29) ------------------------------------------------ * [scdaemon] Overhauled the internal CCID driver. * [scdaemon] Status files named ~/.gnupg/reader_.status are now written when using the internal CCID driver. * [gpgsm] New commands --dump-{,secret,external}-keys to show a very detailed view of the certificates. * The keybox gets now compressed after 3 hours and ephemeral stored certificates are deleted after about a day. * [gpg] Usability fixes for --card-edit. Note, that this has already been ported back to gnupg-1.3 Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.7 (2004-04-06) ------------------------------------------------ * Instrumented the modules for gpgconf. * Added support for DINSIG card applications. * Include the smimeCapabilities attribute with signed messages. * Now uses the gettext domain "gnupg2" to avoid conflicts with gnupg versions < 1.9. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.6 (2004-03-06) ------------------------------------------------ * Code cleanups and bug fixes. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.5 (2004-02-21) ------------------------------------------------ * gpg-protect-tool gets now installed into libexec as it ought to be. Cleaned up the build system to better comply with the coding standards. * [gpgsm] The --import command is now able to autodetect pkcs#12 files and import secret and private keys from this file format. A new command --export-secret-key-p12 is provided to allow exporting of secret keys in PKCS\#12 format. * [gpgsm] The pinentry will now present a description of the key for whom the passphrase is requested. * [gpgsm] New option --with-validation to check the validity of key while listing it. * New option --debug-level={none,basic,advanced,expert,guru} to map the debug flags to sensitive levels on a per program base. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.4 (2004-01-30) ------------------------------------------------ * Added support for the Telesec NKS 2.0 card application. * Added simple tool addgnupghome to create .gnupg directories from /etc/skel/.gnupg. * Various minor bug fixes and cleanups; mainly gpgsm and gpg-agent related. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.3 (2003-12-23) ------------------------------------------------ * New gpgsm options --{enable,disable}-ocsp to validate keys using OCSP. This option requires a not yet released DirMngr version. Default is disabled. * The --log-file option may now be used to print logs to a socket. Prefix the socket name with "socket://" to enable this. This does not work on all systems and falls back to stderr if there is a problem with the socket. * The options --encrypt-to and --no-encrypt-to now work the same in gpgsm as in gpg. Note, they are also used in server mode. * Duplicated recipients are now silently removed in gpgsm. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.2 (2003-11-17) ------------------------------------------------ * On card key generation is no longer done using the --gen-key command but from the menu provided by the new --card-edit command. * PINs are now properly cached and there are only 2 PINs visible. The 3rd PIN (CHV2) is internally syncronized with the regular PIN. * All kind of other internal stuff. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.1 (2003-09-06) ------------------------------------------------ * Support for OpenSC is back. scdaemon supports a --disable-opensc to disable OpenSC use at runtime, so that PC/SC or ct-API can still be used directly. * Rudimentary support for the SCR335 smartcard reader using an internal driver. Requires current libusb from CVS. * Bug fixes. Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.0 (2003-08-05) ------------------------------------------------ ====== PLEASE SEE README-alpha ======= * gpg has been renamed to gpg2 and gpgv to gpgv2. This is a temporary change to allow co-existing with stable gpg versions. * ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf-1.9.0 is fist tried as config file before the usual gpg.conf. * Removed the -k, -kv and -kvv commands. -k is now an alias to --list-keys. New command -K as alias for --list-secret-keys. * Removed --run-as-shm-coprocess feature. * gpg does now also use libgcrypt, libgpg-error is required. * New gpgsm commands --call-dirmngr and --call-protect-tool. * Changing a passphrase is now possible using "gpgsm --passwd" * The content-type attribute is now recognized and created. * The agent does now reread certain options on receiving a HUP. * The pinentry is now forked for each request so that clients with different environments are supported. When running in daemon mode and --keep-display is not used the DISPLAY variable is ignored. * Merged stuff from the newpg branch and started this new development branch. Copyright 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. PK[=QI"  KEYSERVERnuW+AFormat of keyserver colon listings ================================== David Shaw The machine readable response begins with an optional information line: info:: = this is the version of this protocol. Currently, this is the number 1. = the number of keys returned in this response. Note this is the number of keys, and not the number of lines returned. It should match the number of "pub:" lines returned. If this optional line is not included, or the version information is not supplied, the version number is assumed to be 1. The key listings are made up of several lines per key. The first line is for the primary key: pub:::::: = this is either the fingerprint or the keyid of the key. Either the 16-digit or 8-digit keyids are acceptable, but obviously the fingerprint is best. Since it is not possible to calculate the keyid from a V3 key fingerprint, for V3 keys this should be either the 16-digit or 8-digit keyid only. = the algorithm number from RFC-2440. (i.e. 1==RSA, 17==DSA, etc). = the key length (i.e. 1024, 2048, 4096, etc.) = creation date of the key in standard RFC-2440 form (i.e. number of seconds since 1/1/1970 UTC time) = expiration date of the key in standard RFC-2440 form (i.e. number of seconds since 1/1/1970 UTC time) = letter codes to indicate details of the key, if any. Flags may be in any order. r == revoked d == disabled e == expired Following the "pub" line are one or more "uid" lines to indicate user IDs on the key: uid:::: == the user ID string, with HTTP %-escaping for anything that isn't 7-bit safe as well as for the ":" character. Any other characters may be escaped, as desired. creationdate, expirationdate, and flags mean the same here as before. The information is taken from the self-sig, if any, and applies to the user ID in question, and not to the key as a whole. Details: * All characters except for the are case-insensitive. * Obviously, on a keyserver without integrated crypto, many of the items given here are not fully trustworthy until the key is downloaded and signatures checked. For example, the information that a key is flagged "r" for revoked should be treated as untrustworthy information until the key is checked on the client side. * Empty fields are allowed. For example, a key with no expiration date would have the field empty. Also, a keyserver that does not track a particular piece of information may leave that field empty as well. I expect that the creation and expiration dates for user IDs will be left empty in current keyservers. Colons for empty fields on the end of each line may be left off, if desired. PK[7JFAQnuW+A GnuPG Frequently Asked Questions Version: 1.6.3 Last-Modified: Jul 30, 2003 Maintained-by: David D. Scribner, This is the GnuPG FAQ. The latest HTML version is available here. The index is generated automatically, so there may be errors. Not all questions may be in the section they belong to. Suggestions about how to improve the structure of this FAQ are welcome. Please send additions and corrections to the maintainer. It would be most convenient if you could provide the answer to be included here as well. Your help is very much appreciated! Please, don't send message like "This should be a FAQ - what's the answer?". If it hasn't been asked before, it isn't a FAQ. In that case you could search in the mailing list archive. 1. GENERAL 1.1) What is GnuPG? 1.2) Is GnuPG compatible with PGP? 1.3) Is GnuPG free to use for personal or commercial use? 1.4) What conventions are used in this FAQ? 2. SOURCES of INFORMATION 2.1) Where can I find more information on GnuPG? 2.2) Where do I get GnuPG? 3. INSTALLATION 3.1) Which OSes does GnuPG run on? 3.2) Which random data gatherer should I use? 3.3) How do I include support for RSA and IDEA? 4. USAGE 4.1) What is the recommended key size? 4.2) Why does it sometimes take so long to create keys? 4.3) And it really takes long when I work on a remote system. Why? 4.4) What is the difference between options and commands? 4.5) I can't delete a user ID on my secret keyring because it has already been deleted on my public keyring. What can I do? 4.6) I can't delete my secret key because the public key disappeared. What can I do? 4.7) What are trust, validity and ownertrust? 4.8) How do I sign a patch file? 4.9) Where is the "encrypt-to-self" option? 4.10) How can I get rid of the Version and Comment headers in armored messages? 4.11) What does the "You are using the xxxx character set." mean? 4.12) How can I get list of key IDs used to encrypt a message? 4.13) Why can't I decrypt files encrypted as symmetrical-only (-c) with a version of GnuPG prior to 1.0.1. 4.14) How can I use GnuPG in an automated environment? 4.15) Which email-client can I use with GnuPG? 4.16) Can't we have a gpg library? 4.17) I have successfully generated a revocation certificate, but I don't understand how to send it to the key servers. 4.18) How do I put my keyring in a different directory? 4.19) How do I verify signed packages? 4.20) How do I export a keyring with only selected signatures (keys)? 4.21) I still have my secret key, but lost my public key. What can I do? 4.22) Clearsigned messages sent from my web-mail account have an invalid signature. Why? 5. COMPATIBILITY ISSUES 5.1) How can I encrypt a message with GnuPG so that PGP is able to decrypt it? 5.2) How do I migrate from PGP 2.x to GnuPG? 5.3) (removed) 5.4) Why is PGP 5.x not able to encrypt messages with some keys? 5.5) Why is PGP 5.x not able to verify my messages? 5.6) How do I transfer owner trust values from PGP to GnuPG? 5.7) PGP does not like my secret key. 5.8) GnuPG no longer installs a ~/.gnupg/options file. Is it missing? 5.9) How do you export GnuPG keys for use with PGP? 6. PROBLEMS and ERROR MESSAGES 6.1) Why do I get "gpg: Warning: using insecure memory!" 6.2) Large File Support doesn't work ... 6.3) In the edit menu the trust values are not displayed correctly after signing uids. Why? 6.4) What does "skipping pubkey 1: already loaded" mean? 6.5) GnuPG 1.0.4 doesn't create ~/.gnupg ... 6.6) An Elgamal signature does not verify anymore since version 1.0.2 ... 6.7) Old versions of GnuPG can't verify Elgamal signatures 6.8) When I use --clearsign, the plain text has sometimes extra dashes in it - why? 6.9) What is the thing with "can't handle multiple signatures"? 6.10) If I submit a key to a keyserver, nothing happens ... 6.11) I get "gpg: waiting for lock ..." 6.12) Older gpg binaries (e.g., 1.0) have problems with keys from newer gpg binaries ... 6.13) With 1.0.4, I get "this cipher algorithm is deprecated ..." 6.14) Some dates are displayed as ????-??-??. Why? 6.15) I still have a problem. How do I report a bug? 6.16) Why doesn't GnuPG support X.509 certificates? 6.17) Why do national characters in my user ID look funny? 6.18) I get 'sed' errors when running ./configure on Mac OS X ... 6.19) Why does GnuPG 1.0.6 bail out on keyrings used with 1.0.7? 6.20) I upgraded to GnuPG version 1.0.7 and now it takes longer to load my keyrings. What can I do? 6.21) Doesn't a fully trusted user ID on a key prevent warning messages when encrypting to other IDs on the key? 6.22) I just compiled GnuPG from source on my GNU/Linux RPM-based system and it's not working. Why? 7. ADVANCED TOPICS 7.1) How does this whole thing work? 7.2) Why are some signatures with an ELG-E key valid? 7.3) How does the whole trust thing work? 7.4) What kind of output is this: "key C26EE891.298, uid 09FB: ...."? 7.5) How do I interpret some of the informational outputs? 7.6) Are the header lines of a cleartext signature part of the signed material? 7.7) What is the list of preferred algorithms? 7.8) How do I change the list of preferred algorithms? 7.9) How can I import all the missing signer keys? 8. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 1. GENERAL 1.1) What is GnuPG? GnuPG stands for GNU Privacy Guard and is GNU's tool for secure communication and data storage. It can be used to encrypt data and to create digital signatures. It includes an advanced key management facility and is compliant with the proposed OpenPGP Internet standard as described in RFC 2440. As such, it is aimed to be compatible with PGP from PGP Corp. and other OpenPGP tools 1.2) Is GnuPG compatible with PGP? In general, yes. GnuPG and newer PGP releases should be implementing the OpenPGP standard. But there are some interoperability problems. See question 5.1 for details. 1.3) Is GnuPG free to use for personal or commercial use? Yes. GnuPG is part of the GNU family of tools and applications built and provided in accordance with the Free Software Foundation (FSF) General Public License (GPL). Therefore the software is free to copy, use, modify and distribute in accordance with that license. Please read the file titled COPYING that accompanies the application for more information. 1.4) What conventions are used in this FAQ? Although GnuPG is being developed for several operating systems (often in parallel), the conventions used in this FAQ reflect a UNIX shell environment. For Win32 users, references to a shell prompt (`$') should be interpreted as a command prompt (`>'), directory names separated by a forward slash (`/') may need to be converted to a back slash (`\'), and a tilde (`~') represents a user's "home" directory (reference question 4.18 for an example). Some command-lines presented in this FAQ are too long to properly display in some browsers for the web page version of this file, and have been split into two or more lines. For these commands please remember to enter the entire command-string on one line or the command will error, or at minimum not give the desired results. Please keep in mind that this FAQ contains information that may not apply to your particular version, as new features and bug fixes are added on a continuing basis (reference the NEWS file included with the source or package for noteworthy changes between versions). One item to note is that starting with GnuPG version 1.1.92 the file containing user options and settings has been renamed from "options" to "gpg.conf". Information in the FAQ that relates to the options file may be interchangable with the newer gpg.conf file in many instances. See question 5.8 for details. 2. SOURCES of INFORMATION 2.1) Where can I find more information on GnuPG? On-line resources: The documentation page is located at . Also, have a look at the HOWTOs and the GNU Privacy Handbook (GPH, available in English, Spanish and Russian). The latter provides a detailed user's guide to GnuPG. You'll also find a document about how to convert from PGP 2.x to GnuPG. At you'll find an online archive of the GnuPG mailing lists. Most interesting should be gnupg-users for all user-related issues and gnupg-devel if you want to get in touch with the developers. In addition, searchable archives can be found on MARC, e.g.: gnupg-users: gnupg-devel: PLEASE: Before posting to a list, read this FAQ and the available documentation. In addition, search the list archive - maybe your question has already been discussed. This way you help people focus on topics that have not yet been resolved. The GnuPG source distribution contains a subdirectory: ./doc where some additional documentation is located (mainly interesting for hackers, not the casual user). 2.2) Where do I get GnuPG? You can download the GNU Privacy Guard from its primary FTP server or from one of the mirrors: The current stable version is 1.2.2. Please upgrade to this version as it includes additional features, functions and security fixes that may not have existed in prior versions. 3. INSTALLATION 3.1) Which OSes does GnuPG run on? It should run on most Unices as well as Windows versions (including Windows NT/2000) and Macintosh OS/X. A list of OSes reported to be OK is presented at: 3.2) Which random data gatherer should I use? "Good" random numbers are crucial for the security of your encryption. Different operating systems provide a variety of more or less quality random data. Linux and *BSD provide kernel generated random data through /dev/random - this should be the preferred choice on these systems. Also Solaris users with the SUNWski package installed have a /dev/random. In these cases, use the configure option: --enable-static-rnd=linux In addition, there's also the kernel random device by Andi Maier , but it's still beta. Use at your own risk! On other systems, the Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is a good choice. It is a perl-daemon that monitors system activity and hashes it into random data. See the download page to obtain EGD. Use: --enable-static-rnd=egd here. If the above options do not work, you can use the random number generator "unix". This is *very* slow and should be avoided. The random quality isn't very good so don't use it on sensitive data. 3.3) How do I include support for RSA and IDEA? RSA is included as of GnuPG version 1.0.3. The official GnuPG distribution does not contain IDEA due to a patent restriction. The patent does not expire before 2007 so don't expect official support before then. However, there is an unofficial module to include it even in earlier versions of GnuPG. It's available from . Look for: idea.c.gz (c module) idea.c.gz.sig (signature file) ideadll.zip (c module and win32 dll) ideadll.zip.sig (signature file) Compilation directives are in the headers of these files. You will then need to add the following line to your ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf or ~/.gnupg/options file: load-extension idea 4. USAGE 4.1) What is the recommended key size? 1024 bit for DSA signatures; even for plain Elgamal signatures. This is sufficient as the size of the hash is probably the weakest link if the key size is larger than 1024 bits. Encryption keys may have greater sizes, but you should then check the fingerprint of this key: $ gpg --fingerprint As for the key algorithms, you should stick with the default (i.e., DSA signature and Elgamal encryption). An Elgamal signing key has the following disadvantages: the signature is larger, it is hard to create such a key useful for signatures which can withstand some real world attacks, you don't get any extra security compared to DSA, and there might be compatibility problems with certain PGP versions. It has only been introduced because at the time it was not clear whether there was a patent on DSA. 4.2) Why does it sometimes take so long to create keys? The problem here is that we need a lot of random bytes and for that we (on Linux the /dev/random device) must collect some random data. It is really not easy to fill the Linux internal entropy buffer; I talked to Ted Ts'o and he commented that the best way to fill the buffer is to play with your keyboard. Good security has its price. What I do is to hit several times on the shift, control, alternate, and caps lock keys, because these keys do not produce output to the screen. This way you get your keys really fast (it's the same thing PGP2 does). Another problem might be another program which eats up your random bytes (a program (look at your daemons) that reads from /dev/random). 4.3) And it really takes long when I work on a remote system. Why? Don't do this at all! You should never create keys or even use GnuPG on a remote system because you normally have no physical control over your secret key ring (which is in most cases vulnerable to advanced dictionary attacks) - I strongly encourage everyone to only create keys on a local computer (a disconnected laptop is probably the best choice) and if you need it on your connected box (I know, we all do this) be sure to have a strong password for both your account and for your secret key, and that you can trust your system administrator. When I check GnuPG on a remote system via ssh (I have no Alpha here) ;-) I have the same problem. It takes a *very* long time to create the keys, so I use a special option, --quick-random, to generate insecure keys which are only good for some tests. 4.4) What is the difference between options and commands? If you do a 'gpg --help', you will get two separate lists. The first is a list of commands. The second is a list of options. Whenever you run GPG, you must pick exactly one command (with one exception, see below). You may pick one or more options. The command should, just by convention, come at the end of the argument list, after all the options. If the command takes a file (all the basic ones do), the filename comes at the very end. So the basic way to run gpg is: $ gpg [--option something] [--option2] [--option3 something] --command file Some options take arguments. For example, the --output option (which can be abbreviated as -o) is an option that takes a filename. The option's argument must follow immediately after the option itself, otherwise gpg doesn't know which option the argument is supposed to paired with. As an option, --output and its filename must come before the command. The --recipient (-r) option takes a name or keyID to encrypt the message to, which must come right after the -r option. The --encrypt (or -e) command comes after all the options and is followed by the file you wish to encrypt. Therefore in this example the command-line issued would be: $ gpg -r alice -o secret.txt -e test.txt If you write the options out in full, it is easier to read: $ gpg --recipient alice --output secret.txt --encrypt test.txt If you're encrypting to a file with the extension ".txt", then you'd probably expect to see ASCII-armored text in the file (not binary), so you need to add the --armor (-a) option, which doesn't take any arguments: $ gpg --armor --recipient alice --output secret.txt --encrypt test.txt If you imagine square brackets around the optional parts, it becomes a bit clearer: $ gpg [--armor] [--recipient alice] [--output secret.txt] --encrypt test.txt The optional parts can be rearranged any way you want: $ gpg --output secret.txt --recipient alice --armor --encrypt test.txt If your filename begins with a hyphen (e.g. "-a.txt"), GnuPG assumes this is an option and may complain. To avoid this you have to either use "./-a.txt", or stop the option and command processing with two hyphens: "-- -a.txt". *The exception to using only one command:* signing and encrypting at the same time. For this you can combine both commands, such as in: $ gpg [--options] --sign --encrypt foo.txt 4.5) I can't delete a user ID on my secret keyring because it has already been deleted on my public keyring. What can I do? Because you can only select from the public key ring, there is no direct way to do this. However it is not very complicated to do anyway. Create a new user ID with exactly the same name and you will see that there are now two identical user IDs on the secret ring. Now select this user ID and delete it. Both user IDs will be removed from the secret ring. 4.6) I can't delete my secret key because the public key disappeared. What can I do? To select a key a search is always done on the public keyring, therefore it is not possible to select a secret key without having the public key. Normally it should never happen that the public key got lost but the secret key is still available. The reality is different, so GnuPG implements a special way to deal with it: Simply use the long keyID to specify the key to delete, which can be obtained by using the --with-colons options (it is the fifth field in the lines beginning with "sec"). If you've lost your public key and need to recreate it instead for continued use with your secret key, you may be able to use gpgsplit as detailed in question 4.21. 4.7) What are trust, validity and ownertrust? With GnuPG, the term "ownertrust" is used instead of "trust" to help clarify that this is the value you have assigned to a key to express how much you trust the owner of this key to correctly sign (and thereby introduce) other keys. The "validity", or calculated trust, is a value which indicates how much GnuPG considers a key as being valid (that it really belongs to the one who claims to be the owner of the key). For more information on trust values see the chapter "The Web of Trust" in The GNU Privacy Handbook. 4.8) How do I sign a patch file? Use "gpg --clearsign --not-dash-escaped ...". The problem with --clearsign is that all lines starting with a dash are quoted with "- "; obviously diff produces many lines starting with a dash and these are then quoted and that is not good for a patch ;-). To use a patch file without removing the cleartext signature, the special option --not-dash-escaped may be used to suppress generation of these escape sequences. You should not mail such a patch because spaces and line endings are also subject to the signature and a mailer may not preserve these. If you want to mail a file you can simply sign it using your MUA (Mail User Agent). 4.9) Where is the "encrypt-to-self" option? Use "--encrypt-to your_keyID". You can use more than one of these options. To temporarily override the use of this additional key, you can use the option "--no-encrypt-to". 4.10) How can I get rid of the Version and Comment headers in armored messages? Use "--no-version --comment ''". Note that the left over blank line is required by the protocol. 4.11) What does the "You are using the xxxx character set." mean? This note is printed when UTF-8 mapping has to be done. Make sure that the displayed character set is the one you have activated on your system. Since "iso-8859-1" is the character set most used, this is the default. You can change the charset with the option "--charset". It is important that your active character set matches the one displayed - if not, restrict yourself to plain 7 bit ASCII and no mapping has to be done. 4.12) How can I get list of key IDs used to encrypt a message? $ gpg --batch --decrypt --list-only --status-fd 1 2>/dev/null | awk '/^\[GNUPG:\] ENC_TO / { print $3 }' 4.13) Why can't I decrypt files encrypted as symmetrical-only (-c) with a version of GnuPG prior to 1.0.1. There was a bug in GnuPG versions prior to 1.0.1 which affected files only if 3DES or Twofish was used for symmetric-only encryption (this has never been the default). The bug has been fixed, but to enable decryption of old files you should run gpg with the option "--emulate-3des-s2k-bug", decrypt the file and encrypt it again without this option. NOTE: This option was removed in GnuPG development version 1.1.0 and later updates, so you will need to use a version between 1.0.1 and 1.0.7 to re-encrypt any affected files. 4.14) How can I use GnuPG in an automated environment? You should use the option --batch and don't use passphrases as there is usually no way to store it more securely than on the secret keyring itself. The suggested way to create keys for an automated environment is: On a secure machine: If you want to do automatic signing, create a signing subkey for your key (use the interactive key editing menu by issueing the command 'gpg --edit-key keyID', enter "addkey" and select the DSA key type). Make sure that you use a passphrase (needed by the current implementation). gpg --export-secret-subkeys --no-comment foo >secring.auto Copy secring.auto and the public keyring to a test directory. Change to this directory. gpg --homedir . --edit foo and use "passwd" to remove the passphrase from the subkeys. You may also want to remove all unused subkeys. Copy secring.auto to a floppy and carry it to the target box. On the target machine: Install secring.auto as the secret keyring. Now you can start your new service. It's also a good idea to install an intrusion detection system so that you hopefully get a notice of an successful intrusion, so that you in turn can revoke all the subkeys installed on that machine and install new subkeys. 4.15) Which email-client can I use with GnuPG? Using GnuPG to encrypt email is one of the most popular uses. Several mail clients or mail user agents (MUAs) support GnuPG to varying degrees. Simplifying a bit, there are two ways mail can be encrypted with GnuPG: the "old style" ASCII armor (i.e. cleartext encryption), and RFC 2015 style (previously PGP/MIME, now OpenPGP). The latter has full MIME support. Some MUAs support only one of them, so whichever you actually use depends on your needs as well as the capabilities of your addressee. As well, support may be native to the MUA, or provided via "plug-ins" or external tools. The following list is not exhaustive: MUA OpenPGP ASCII How? (N,P,T) ------------------------------------------------------------- Calypso N Y P (Unixmail) Elm N Y T (mailpgp,morepgp) Elm ME+ N Y N Emacs/Gnus Y Y T (Mailcrypt,gpg.el) Emacs/Mew Y Y N Emacs/VM N Y T (Mailcrypt) Evolution Y Y N Exmh Y Y N GNUMail.app Y Y P (PGPBundle) GPGMail Y Y N KMail (<=1.4.x) N Y N KMail (1.5.x) Y(P) Y(N) P/N Mozilla Y Y P (Enigmail) Mulberry Y Y P Mutt Y Y N Sylpheed Y Y N Claws-mail Y Y N TkRat Y Y N XEmacs/Gnus Y Y T (Mailcrypt) XEmacs/Mew Y Y N XEmacs/VM N Y T (Mailcrypt) XFmail Y Y N N - Native, P - Plug-in, T - External Tool The following table lists proprietary MUAs. The GNU Project suggests against the use of these programs, but they are listed for interoperability reasons for your convenience. MUA OpenPGP ASCII How? (N,P,T) ------------------------------------------------------------- Apple Mail Y Y P (GPGMail) Becky2 Y Y P (BkGnuPG) Eudora Y Y P (EuroraGPG) Eudora Pro Y Y P (EudoraGPG) Lotus Notes N Y P Netscape 4.x N Y P Netscape 7.x Y Y P (Enigmail) Novell Groupwise N Y P Outlook N Y P (G-Data) Outlook Express N Y P (GPGOE) Pegasus N Y P (QDPGP,PM-PGP) Pine N Y T (pgpenvelope,(gpg|pgp)4pine) Postme N Y P (GPGPPL) The Bat! N Y P (Ritlabs) Good overviews of OpenPGP-support can be found at: and . Users of Win32 MUAs that lack OpenPGP support may look into using GPGrelay , a small email-relaying server that uses GnuPG to enable many email clients to send and receive emails that conform to PGP-MIME (RFC 2015). 4.16) Can't we have a gpg library? This has been frequently requested. However, the current viewpoint of the GnuPG maintainers is that this would lead to several security issues and will therefore not be implemented in the foreseeable future. However, for some areas of application gpgme could do the trick. You'll find it at . 4.17) I have successfully generated a revocation certificate, but I don't understand how to send it to the key servers. Most keyservers don't accept a 'bare' revocation certificate. You have to import the certificate into gpg first: $ gpg --import my-revocation.asc then send the revoked key to the keyservers: $ gpg --keyserver certserver.pgp.com --send-keys mykeyid (or use a keyserver web interface for this). 4.18) How do I put my keyring in a different directory? GnuPG keeps several files in a special homedir directory. These include the options file, pubring.gpg, secring.gpg, trustdb.gpg, and others. GnuPG will always create and use these files. On unices, the homedir is usually ~/.gnupg; on Windows it is name "gnupg" and found below the user's application directory. Run the gpg and pass the option --version to see the name of that directory. If you want to put your keyrings somewhere else, use the option: --homedir /my/path/ to make GnuPG create all its files in that directory. Your keyring will be "/my/path/pubring.gpg". This way you can store your secrets on a floppy disk. Don't use "--keyring" as its purpose is to specify additional keyring files. 4.19) How do I verify signed packages? Before you can verify the signature that accompanies a package, you must first have the vendor, organisation, or issueing person's key imported into your public keyring. To prevent GnuPG warning messages the key should also be validated (or locally signed). You will also need to download the detached signature file along with the package. These files will usually have the same name as the package, with either a binary (.sig) or ASCII armor (.asc) extension. Once their key has been imported, and the package and accompanying signature files have been downloaded, use: $ gpg --verify sigfile signed-file If the signature file has the same base name as the package file, the package can also be verified by specifying just the signature file, as GnuPG will derive the package's file name from the name given (less the .sig or .asc extension). For example, to verify a package named foobar.tar.gz against its detached binary signature file, use: $ gpg --verify foobar.tar.gz.sig 4.20) How do I export a keyring with only selected signatures (keys)? If you're wanting to create a keyring with only a subset of keys selected from a master keyring (for a club, user group, or company department for example), simply specify the keys you want to export: $ gpg --armor --export key1 key2 key3 key4 > keys1-4.asc 4.21) I still have my secret key, but lost my public key. What can I do? All OpenPGP secret keys have a copy of the public key inside them, and in a worst-case scenario, you can create yourself a new public key using the secret key. A tool to convert a secret key into a public one has been included (it's actually a new option for gpgsplit) and is available with GnuPG versions 1.2.1 or later (or can be found in CVS). It works like this: $ gpgsplit --no-split --secret-to-public secret.gpg >publickey.gpg One should first try to export the secret key and convert just this one. Using the entire secret keyring should work too. After this has been done, the publickey.gpg file can be imported into GnuPG as usual. 4.22) Clearsigned messages sent from my web-mail account have an invalid signature. Why? Check to make sure the settings for your web-based email account do not use HTML formatting for the pasted clearsigned message. This can alter the message with embedded HTML markup tags or spaces, resulting in an invalid signature. The recipient may be able to copy the signed message block to a text file for verification, or the web email service may allow you to attach the clearsigned message as a file if plaintext messages are not an option. 5. COMPATIBILITY ISSUES 5.1) How can I encrypt a message with GnuPG so that PGP is able to decrypt it? It depends on the PGP version. PGP 2.x You can't do that because PGP 2.x normally uses IDEA which is not supported by GnuPG as it is patented (see 3.3), but if you have a modified version of PGP you can try this: $ gpg --rfc1991 --cipher-algo 3des ... Please don't pipe the data to encrypt to gpg but provide it using a filename; otherwise, PGP 2 will not be able to handle it. As for conventional encryption, you can't do this for PGP 2. PGP 5.x and higher You need to provide two additional options: --compress-algo 1 --cipher-algo cast5 You may also use "3des" instead of "cast5", and "blowfish" does not work with all versions of PGP 5. You may also want to put: compress-algo 1 into your ~/.gnupg/options file - this does not affect normal GnuPG operation. This applies to conventional encryption as well. 5.2) How do I migrate from PGP 2.x to GnuPG? PGP 2 uses the RSA and IDEA encryption algorithms. Whereas the RSA patent has expired and RSA is included as of GnuPG 1.0.3, the IDEA algorithm is still patented until 2007. Under certain conditions you may use IDEA even today. In that case, you may refer to Question 3.3 about how to add IDEA support to GnuPG and read to perform the migration. 5.3) (removed) (empty) 5.4) Why is PGP 5.x not able to encrypt messages with some keys? PGP, Inc. refuses to accept Elgamal keys of type 20 even for encryption. They only support type 16 (which is identical at least for decryption). To be more inter-operable, GnuPG (starting with version 0.3.3) now also uses type 16 for the Elgamal subkey which is created if the default key algorithm is chosen. You may add a type 16 Elgamal key to your public key, which is easy as your key signatures are still valid. 5.5) Why is PGP 5.x not able to verify my messages? PGP 5.x does not accept v4 signatures for data material but OpenPGP requests generation of v4 signatures for all kind of data, that's why GnuPG defaults to them. Use the option "--force-v3-sigs" to generate v3 signatures for data. 5.6) How do I transfer owner trust values from PGP to GnuPG? There is a script in the tools directory to help you. After you have imported the PGP keyring you can give this command: $ lspgpot pgpkeyring | gpg --import-ownertrust where pgpkeyring is the original keyring and not the GnuPG keyring you might have created in the first step. 5.7) PGP does not like my secret key. Older PGPs probably bail out on some private comment packets used by GnuPG. These packets are fully in compliance with OpenPGP; however PGP is not really OpenPGP aware. A workaround is to export the secret keys with this command: $ gpg --export-secret-keys --no-comment -a your-KeyID Another possibility is this: by default, GnuPG encrypts your secret key using the Blowfish symmetric algorithm. Older PGPs will only understand 3DES, CAST5, or IDEA symmetric algorithms. Using the following method you can re-encrypt your secret gpg key with a different algo: $ gpg --s2k-cipher-algo=CAST5 --s2k-digest-algo=SHA1 --compress-algo=1 --edit-key Then use passwd to change the password (just change it to the same thing, but it will encrypt the key with CAST5 this time). Now you can export it and PGP should be able to handle it. For PGP 6.x the following options work to export a key: $ gpg --s2k-cipher-algo 3des --compress-algo 1 --rfc1991 --export-secret-keys 5.8) GnuPG no longer installs a ~/.gnupg/options file. Is it missing? No. The ~/.gnupg/options file has been renamed to ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf for new installs as of version 1.1.92. If an existing ~/.gnupg/options file is found during an upgrade it will still be used, but this change was required to have a more consistent naming scheme with forthcoming tools. An existing options file can be renamed to gpg.conf for users upgrading, or receiving the message that the "old default options file" is ignored (occurs if both a gpg.conf and an options file are found). 5.9) How do you export GnuPG keys for use with PGP? This has come up fairly often, so here's the HOWTO: PGP can (for most key types) use secret keys generated by GnuPG. The problems that come up occasionally are generally because GnuPG supports a few more features from the OpenPGP standard than PGP does. If your secret key has any of those features in use, then PGP will reject the key or you will have problems communicating later. Note that PGP doesn't do Elgamal signing keys at all, so they are not usable with any version. These instructions should work for GnuPG 1.0.7 and later, and PGP 7.0.3 and later. Start by editing the key. Most of this line is not really necessary as the default values are correct, but it does not hurt to repeat the values, as this will override them in case you have something else set in your options file. $ gpg --s2k-cipher-algo cast5 --s2k-digest-algo sha1 --s2k-mode 3 --simple-sk-checksum --edit KeyID Turn off some features. Set the list of preferred ciphers, hashes, and compression algorithms to things that PGP can handle. (Yes, I know this is an odd list of ciphers, but this is what PGP itself uses, minus IDEA). > setpref S9 S8 S7 S3 S2 S10 H2 H3 Z1 Z0 Now put the list of preferences onto the key. > updpref Finally we must decrypt and re-encrypt the key, making sure that we encrypt with a cipher that PGP likes. We set this up in the --edit line above, so now we just need to change the passphrase to make it take effect. You can use the same passphrase if you like, or take this opportunity to actually change it. > passwd Save our work. > save Now we can do the usual export: $ gpg --export KeyID > mypublickey.pgp $ gpg --export-secret-key KeyID > mysecretkey.pgp Thanks to David Shaw for this information! 6. PROBLEMS and ERROR MESSAGES 6.1) Why do I get "gpg: Warning: using insecure memory!" On many systems this program should be installed as setuid(root). This is necessary to lock memory pages. Locking memory pages prevents the operating system from writing them to disk and thereby keeping your secret keys really secret. If you get no warning message about insecure memory your operating system supports locking without being root. The program drops root privileges as soon as locked memory is allocated. To setuid(root) permissions on the gpg binary you can either use: $ chmod u+s /path/to/gpg or $ chmod 4755 /path/to/gpg Some refrain from using setuid(root) unless absolutely required for security reasons. Please check with your system administrator if you are not able to make these determinations yourself. On UnixWare 2.x and 7.x you should install GnuPG with the 'plock' privilege to get the same effect: $ filepriv -f plock /path/to/gpg If you can't or don't want to install GnuPG setuid(root), you can use the option "--no-secmem-warning" or put: no-secmem-warning in your ~/.gnupg/options or ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf file (this disables the warning). On some systems (e.g., Windows) GnuPG does not lock memory pages and older GnuPG versions (<=1.0.4) issue the warning: gpg: Please note that you don't have secure memory This warning can't be switched off by the above option because it was thought to be too serious an issue. However, it confused users too much, so the warning was eventually removed. 6.2) Large File Support doesn't work ... LFS works correctly in post-1.0.4 versions. If configure doesn't detect it, try a different (i.e., better) compiler. egcs 1.1.2 works fine, other gccs sometimes don't. BTW, several compilation problems of GnuPG 1.0.3 and 1.0.4 on HP-UX and Solaris were due to broken LFS support. 6.3) In the edit menu the trust values are not displayed correctly after signing uids. Why? This happens because some information is stored immediately in the trustdb, but the actual trust calculation can be done after the save command. This is a "not easy to fix" design bug which will be addressed in some future release. 6.4) What does "skipping pubkey 1: already loaded" mean? As of GnuPG 1.0.3, the RSA algorithm is included. If you still have a "load-extension rsa" in your options file, the above message occurs. Just remove the load command from the options file. 6.5) GnuPG 1.0.4 doesn't create ~/.gnupg ... That's a known bug, already fixed in newer versions. 6.6) An Elgamal signature does not verify anymore since version 1.0.2 ... Use the option --emulate-md-encode-bug. 6.7) Old versions of GnuPG can't verify Elgamal signatures Update to GnuPG 1.0.2 or newer. 6.8) When I use --clearsign, the plain text has sometimes extra dashes in it - why? This is called dash-escaped text and is required by OpenPGP. It always happens when a line starts with a dash ("-") and is needed to make the lines that structure signature and text (i.e., "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----") to be the only lines that start with two dashes. If you use GnuPG to process those messages, the extra dashes are removed. Good mail clients remove those extra dashes when displaying such a message. 6.9) What is the thing with "can't handle multiple signatures"? Due to different message formats GnuPG is not always able to split a file with multiple signatures unambiguously into its parts. This error message informs you that there is something wrong with the input. The only way to have multiple signatures in a file is by using the OpenPGP format with one-pass-signature packets (which is GnuPG's default) or the cleartext signed format. 6.10) If I submit a key to a keyserver, nothing happens ... You are most likely using GnuPG 1.0.2 or older on Windows. That's feature isn't yet implemented, but it's a bug not to say it. Newer versions issue a warning. Upgrade to 1.4.5 or newer. 6.11) I get "gpg: waiting for lock ..." A previous instance of gpg has most likely exited abnormally and left a lock file. Go to ~/.gnupg and look for .*.lock files and remove them. 6.12) Older gpg binaries (e.g., 1.0) have problems with keys from newer gpg binaries ... As of 1.0.3, keys generated with gpg are created with preferences to TWOFISH (and AES since 1.0.4) and that also means that they have the capability to use the new MDC encryption method. This will go into OpenPGP soon, and is also suppoted by PGP 7. This new method avoids a (not so new) attack on all email encryption systems. This in turn means that pre-1.0.3 gpg binaries have problems with newer keys. Because of security and bug fixes, you should keep your GnuPG installation in a recent state anyway. As a workaround, you can force gpg to use a previous default cipher algo by putting: cipher-algo cast5 into your options file. 6.13) With 1.0.4, I get "this cipher algorithm is deprecated ..." If you just generated a new key and get this message while encrypting, you've witnessed a bug in 1.0.4. It uses the new AES cipher Rijndael that is incorrectly being referred as "deprecated". Ignore this warning, more recent versions of gpg are corrected. 6.14) Some dates are displayed as ????-??-??. Why? Due to constraints in most libc implementations, dates beyond 2038-01-19 can't be displayed correctly. 64-bit OSes are not affected by this problem. To avoid printing wrong dates, GnuPG instead prints some question marks. To see the correct value, you can use the options --with-colons and --fixed-list-mode. 6.15) I still have a problem. How do I report a bug? Are you sure that it's not been mentioned somewhere on the mailing lists? Did you have a look at the bug list (you'll find a link to the list of reported bugs on the documentation page). If you're not sure about it being a bug, you can send mail to the gnupg-devel list. Otherwise, use the bug tracking system . 6.16) Why doesn't GnuPG support X.509 certificates? GnuPG, first and foremost, is an implementation of the OpenPGP standard (RFC 2440), which is a competing infrastructure, different from X.509. They are both public-key cryptosystems, but how the public keys are actually handled is different. 6.17) Why do national characters in my user ID look funny? According to OpenPGP, GnuPG encodes user ID strings (and other things) using UTF-8. In this encoding of Unicode, most national characters get encoded as two- or three-byte sequences. For example, å (0xE5 in ISO-8859-1) becomes Ã¥ (0xC3, 0xA5). This might also be the reason why keyservers can't find your key. 6.18) I get 'sed' errors when running ./configure on Mac OS X ... This will be fixed after GnuPG has been upgraded to autoconf-2.50. Until then, find the line setting CDPATH in the configure script and place an: unset CDPATH statement below it. 6.19) Why does GnuPG 1.0.6 bail out on keyrings used with 1.0.7? There is a small bug in 1.0.6 which didn't parse trust packets correctly. You may want to apply this patch if you can't upgrade: 6.20) I upgraded to GnuPG version 1.0.7 and now it takes longer to load my keyrings. What can I do? The way signature states are stored has changed so that v3 signatures can be supported. You can use the new --rebuild-keydb-caches migration command, which was built into this release and increases the speed of many operations for existing keyrings. 6.21) Doesn't a fully trusted user ID on a key prevent warning messages when encrypting to other IDs on the key? No. That was actually a key validity bug in GnuPG 1.2.1 and earlier versions. As part of the development of GnuPG 1.2.2, a bug was discovered in the key validation code. This bug causes keys with more than one user ID to give all user IDs on the key the amount of validity given to the most-valid key. The bug has been fixed in GnuPG release 1.2.2, and upgrading is the recommended fix for this problem. More information and a patch for a some pre-1.2.2 versions of GnuPG can be found at: 6.22) I just compiled GnuPG from source on my GNU/Linux RPM-based system and it's not working. Why? Many GNU/Linux distributions that are RPM-based will install a version of GnuPG as part of its standard installation, placing the binaries in the /usr/bin directory. Later, compiling and installing GnuPG from source other than from a source RPM won't normally overwrite these files, as the default location for placement of GnuPG binaries is in /usr/local/bin unless the '--prefix' switch is used during compile to specify an alternate location. Since the /usr/bin directory more than likely appears in your path before /usr/local/bin, the older RPM-version binaries will continue to be used when called since they were not replaced. To resolve this, uninstall the RPM-based version with 'rpm -e gnupg' before installing the binaries compiled from source. If dependency errors are displayed when attempting to uninstall the RPM (such as when Red Hat's up2date is also installed, which uses GnuPG), uninstall the RPM with 'rpm -e gnupg --nodeps' to force the uninstall. Any dependent files should be automatically replaced during the install of the compiled version. If the default /usr/local/bin directory is used, some packages such as SuSE's Yast Online Update may need to be configured to look for GnuPG binaries in the /usr/local/bin directory, or symlinks can be created in /usr/bin that point to the binaries located in /usr/local/bin. 7. ADVANCED TOPICS 7.1) How does this whole thing work? To generate a secret/public keypair, run: $ gpg --gen-key and choose the default values. Data that is encrypted with a public key can only be decrypted by the matching secret key. The secret key is protected by a password, the public key is not. So to send your friend a message, you would encrypt your message with his public key, and he would only be able to decrypt it by having the secret key and putting in the password to use his secret key. GnuPG is also useful for signing things. Files that are encrypted with the secret key can be decrypted with the public key. To sign something, a hash is taken of the data, and then the hash is in some form encoded with the secret key. If someone has your public key, they can verify that it is from you and that it hasn't changed by checking the encoded form of the hash with the public key. A keyring is just a large file that stores keys. You have a public keyring where you store yours and your friend's public keys. You have a secret keyring that you keep your secret key on, and should be very careful with. Never ever give anyone else access to it and use a *good* passphrase to protect the data in it. You can 'conventionally' encrypt something by using the option 'gpg -c'. It is encrypted using a passphrase, and does not use public and secret keys. If the person you send the data to knows that passphrase, they can decrypt it. This is usually most useful for encrypting things to yourself, although you can encrypt things to your own public key in the same way. It should be used for communication with partners you know and where it is easy to exchange the passphrases (e.g. with your boy friend or your wife). The advantage is that you can change the passphrase from time to time and decrease the risk, that many old messages may be decrypted by people who accidently got your passphrase. You can add and copy keys to and from your keyring with the 'gpg --import' and 'gpg --export' command. 'gpg --export-secret-keys' will export secret keys. This is normally not useful, but you can generate the key on one machine then move it to another machine. Keys can be signed under the 'gpg --edit-key' option. When you sign a key, you are saying that you are certain that the key belongs to the person it says it comes from. You should be very sure that is really that person: You should verify the key fingerprint with: $ gpg --fingerprint KeyID over the phone (if you really know the voice of the other person), at a key signing party (which are often held at computer conferences), or at a meeting of your local GNU/Linux User Group. Hmm, what else. You may use the option '-o filename' to force output to this filename (use '-' to force output to stdout). '-r' just lets you specify the recipient (which public key you encrypt with) on the command line instead of typing it interactively. Oh yeah, this is important. By default all data is encrypted in some weird binary format. If you want to have things appear in ASCII text that is readable, just add the '-a' option. But the preferred method is to use a MIME aware mail reader (Mutt, Pine and many more). There is a small security glitch in the OpenPGP (and therefore GnuPG) system; to avoid this you should always sign and encrypt a message instead of only encrypting it. 7.2) Why are some signatures with an ELG-E key valid? These are Elgamal keys generated by GnuPG in v3 (RFC 1991) packets. The OpenPGP draft later changed the algorithm identifier for Elgamal keys which are usable for signatures and encryption from 16 to 20. GnuPG now uses 20 when it generates new Elgamal keys but still accepts 16 (which is according to OpenPGP "encryption only") if this key is in a v3 packet. GnuPG is the only program which had used these v3 Elgamal keys - so this assumption is quite safe. 7.3) How does the whole trust thing work? It works more or less like PGP. The difference is that the trust is computed at the time it is needed. This is one of the reasons for the trustdb which holds a list of valid key signatures. If you are not running in batch mode you will be asked to assign a trust parameter (ownertrust) to a key. You can see the validity (calculated trust value) using this command. $ gpg --list-keys --with-colons If the first field is "pub" or "uid", the second field shows you the trust: o = Unknown (this key is new to the system) e = The key has expired q = Undefined (no value assigned) n = Don't trust this key at all m = There is marginal trust in this key f = The key is full trusted u = The key is ultimately trusted; this is only used for keys for which the secret key is also available. r = The key has been revoked d = The key has been disabled The value in the "pub" record is the best one of all "uid" records. You can get a list of the assigned trust values (how much you trust the owner to correctly sign another person's key) with: $ gpg --list-ownertrust The first field is the fingerprint of the primary key, the second field is the assigned value: - = No ownertrust value yet assigned or calculated. n = Never trust this keyholder to correctly verify others signatures. m = Have marginal trust in the keyholders capability to sign other keys. f = Assume that the key holder really knows how to sign keys. u = No need to trust ourself because we have the secret key. Keep these values confidential because they express your opinions about others. PGP stores this information with the keyring thus it is not a good idea to publish a PGP keyring instead of exporting the keyring. GnuPG stores the trust in the trustdb.gpg file so it is okay to give a gpg keyring away (but we have a --export command too). 7.4) What kind of output is this: "key C26EE891.298, uid 09FB: ...."? This is the internal representation of a user ID in the trustdb. "C26EE891" is the keyid, "298" is the local ID (a record number in the trustdb) and "09FB" is the last two bytes of a ripe-md-160 hash of the user ID for this key. 7.5) How do I interpret some of the informational outputs? While checking the validity of a key, GnuPG sometimes prints some information which is prefixed with information about the checked item. "key 12345678.3456" This is about the key with key ID 12345678 and the internal number 3456, which is the record number of the so called directory record in the trustdb. "uid 12345678.3456/ACDE" This is about the user ID for the same key. To identify the user ID the last two bytes of a ripe-md-160 over the user ID ring is printed. "sig 12345678.3456/ACDE/9A8B7C6D" This is about the signature with key ID 9A8B7C6D for the above key and user ID, if it is a signature which is direct on a key, the user ID part is empty (..//..). 7.6) Are the header lines of a cleartext signature part of the signed material? No. For example you can add or remove "Comment:" lines. They have a purpose like the mail header lines. However a "Hash:" line is needed for OpenPGP signatures to tell the parser which hash algorithm to use. 7.7) What is the list of preferred algorithms? The list of preferred algorithms is a list of cipher, hash and compression algorithms stored in the self-signature of a key during key generation. When you encrypt a document, GnuPG uses this list (which is then part of a public key) to determine which algorithms to use. Basically it tells other people what algorithms the recipient is able to handle and provides an order of preference. 7.8) How do I change the list of preferred algorithms? In version 1.0.7 or later, you can use the edit menu and set the new list of preference using the command "setpref"; the format of this command resembles the output of the command "pref". The preference is not changed immediately but the set preference will be used when a new user ID is created. If you want to update the preferences for existing user IDs, select those user IDs (or select none to update all) and enter the command "updpref". Note that the timestamp of the self-signature is increased by one second when running this command. 7.9) How can I import all the missing signer keys? If you imported a key and you want to also import all the signer's keys, you can do this with this command: gpg --check-sigs --with-colon KEYID \ | awk -F: '$1 == "sig" && $2 == "?" { print $5 }' \ | sort | uniq | xargs echo gpg --recv-keys Note that the invocation of sort is also required to wait for the of the listing before before starting the import. 8. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many thanks to Nils Ellmenreich for maintaining this FAQ file for such a long time, Werner Koch for the original FAQ file, and to all posters to gnupg-users and gnupg-devel. They all provided most of the answers. Also thanks to Casper Dik for providing us with a script to generate this FAQ (he uses it for the excellent Solaris2 FAQ). Copyright (C) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02111, USA Verbatim copying and distribution of this entire article is permitted in any medium, provided this notice is preserved. PK[NCOPYINGnuW+A GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE Version 3, 29 June 2007 Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this license document, but changing it is not allowed. Preamble The GNU General Public License is a free, copyleft license for software and other kinds of works. 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PK[=3examples/pwpattern.listnuW+A# pwpattern.list -*- default-generic -*- # # This is an example for a pattern file as used by gpg-check-pattern. # The file is line based with comment lines beginning on the *first* # position with a '#'. Empty lines and lines with just spaces are # ignored. The other lines may be verbatim patterns and match as they # are (trailing spaces are ignored) or extended regular expressions # indicated by a / in the first column and terminated by another / or # end of line. All comparisons are case insensitive. # Reject the usual metavariables. Usual not required because # gpg-agent can be used to reject all passphrases shorter than 8 # charactes. foo bar baz # As well as very common passwords. Note that gpg-agent can be used # to reject them due to missing non-alpha characters. password passwort passphrase mantra test abc egal # German number plates. /^[A-Z]{1,3}[ ]*-[ ]*[A-Z]{1,2}[ ]*[0-9]+/ # Dates (very limited, only ISO dates). */ /^[012][0-9][0-9][0-9]-[012][0-9]-[0123][0-9]$/ # Arbitrary strings the quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dogs back no-password no password 12345678 123456789 1234567890 87654321 987654321 0987654321 qwertyuiop qwertzuiop asdfghjkl zxcvbnm PK[2ē examples/trustlist.txtnuW+A# This is the global list of trusted keys. Comment lines, like this # one, as well as empty lines are ignored. Lines have a length limit # but this is not serious limitation as the format of the entries is # fixed and checked by gpg-agent. A non-comment line starts with # optional white space, followed by the SHA-1 fingerpint in hex, # optionally followed by a flag character which my either be 'P', 'S' # or '*'. This file will be read by gpg-agent if no local trustlist # is available or if the statement "include-default" is used in the # local list. You should give the gpg-agent(s) a HUP after editing # this file. #Serial number: 32D18D # Issuer: /CN=6R-Ca 1:PN/NameDistinguisher=1/O=RegulierungsbehÈorde # fÈur Telekommunikation und Post/C=DE EA:8D:99:DD:36:AA:2D:07:1A:3C:7B:69:00:9E:51:B9:4A:2E:E7:60 S #Serial number: 00C48C8D # Issuer: /CN=7R-CA 1:PN/NameDistinguisher=1/O=RegulierungsbehÈorde # fÈur Telekommunikation und Post/C=DE DB:45:3D:1B:B0:1A:F3:23:10:6B:DE:D0:09:61:57:AA:F4:25:E0:5B S #Serial number: 01 # Issuer: /CN=8R-CA 1:PN/O=Regulierungsbehörde für # Telekommunikation und Post/C=DE 42:6A:F6:78:30:E9:CE:24:5B:EF:41:A2:C1:A8:51:DA:C5:0A:6D:F5 S #Serial number: 02 # Issuer: /CN=9R-CA 1:PN/O=Regulierungsbehörde für # Telekommunikation und Post/C=DE 75:9A:4A:CE:7C:DA:7E:89:1B:B2:72:4B:E3:76:EA:47:3A:96:97:24 S #Serial number: 2A # Issuer: /CN=10R-CA 1:PN/O=Bundesnetzagentur/C=DE 31:C9:D2:E6:31:4D:0B:CC:2C:1A:45:00:A6:6B:97:98:27:18:8E:CD S #Serial number: 2D # Issuer: /CN=11R-CA 1:PN/O=Bundesnetzagentur/C=DE A0:8B:DF:3B:AA:EE:3F:9D:64:6C:47:81:23:21:D4:A6:18:81:67:1D S # S/N: 0139 # Issuer: /CN=12R-CA 1:PN/O=Bundesnetzagentur/C=DE 44:7E:D4:E3:9A:D7:92:E2:07:FA:53:1A:2E:F5:B8:02:5B:47:57:B0 de # S/N: 013C # Issuer: /CN=13R-CA 1:PN/O=Bundesnetzagentur/C=DE AC:A7:BE:45:1F:A6:BF:09:F2:D1:3F:08:7B:BC:EB:7F:46:A2:CC:8A de # S/N: 00B3963E0E6C2D65125853E970665402E5 # Issuer: /CN=S-TRUST Qualified Root CA 2008-001:PN # /O=Deutscher Sparkassen Verlag GmbH/L=Stuttgart/C=DE C9:2F:E6:50:DB:32:59:E0:CE:65:55:F3:8C:76:E0:B8:A8:FE:A3:CA S # S/N: 00C4216083F35C54F67B09A80C3C55FE7D # Issuer: /CN=S-TRUST Qualified Root CA 2008-002:PN # /O=Deutscher Sparkassen Verlag GmbH/L=Stuttgart/C=DE D5:C7:50:F2:FE:4E:EE:D7:C7:B1:E4:13:7B:FB:54:84:3A:7D:97:9B S #Serial number: 00 # Issuer: /CN=CA Cert Signing Authority/OU=http:\x2f\x2fwww. # cacert.org/O=Root CA/EMail=support@cacert.org 13:5C:EC:36:F4:9C:B8:E9:3B:1A:B2:70:CD:80:88:46:76:CE:8F:33 S PK[Iqk- - examples/gpgconf.confnuW+A# gpgconf.conf - configuration for gpgconf #---------------------------------------------------------------------- # This file is read by gpgconf(1) to setup defaults for all or # specified users and groups. It may be used to change the hardwired # defaults in gpgconf and to enforce certain values for the various # GnuPG related configuration files. # # Empty lines and comment lines, indicated by a hash mark as first non # white space character, are ignored. The line is separated by white # space into fields. The first field is used to match the user or # group and must start at the first column, the file is processes # sequential until a matching rule is found. A rule may contain # several lines; continuation lines are indicated by a indenting them. # # Syntax of a line: # |WS